

ACADEMIC PAPER

# GENDER EQUALITY AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR LIBYA





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VIOLENT EXTREMISM:  
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FOR LIBYA**

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**MONASH UNIVERSITY'S GENDER PEACE  
AND SECURITY CENTRE**

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MONASH  
GENDER  
PEACE AND  
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## 1.0

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research report examines the gender dynamics of radicalization to violence in Libya and efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism. Based on primary research in Libya, this report analyses new data collected in the field (October 2018 to March 2019), and via a survey instrument (March-June 2019). The research investigates the gendered motivations of individuals to join violent extremist and terrorist groups, and how gender inequality and discrimination within Libyan society interact with other economic, political and religious factors to spread violent extremism. The report explores how social constructions of masculinity and femininity are manipulated by violent extremist groups through their recruitment strategies and tactics of group control. As well as these gender dynamics, the research investigates Libyan women's responses; how and why they seek to counter and prevent violent extremism in their communities.

### Six overarching research findings emerged from this research:

#### 1.1

#### **Hostile sexist attitudes toward women and support for violence against women are the factor most strongly associated with support for violent extremism based on our survey research.**

There was no correlation at all between the degrees of religiosity, age, gender, level of education achieved, employment, or the region of Libya in which a respondent resided and support for violent extremism. This finding is a pattern across the whole population surveyed and when disaggregating youth (18-25 years) and adults (25 years +) as groups. The association between support for violence against women and violent extremism was more pronounced among men than women. However, support for violence against women was a statistically significant factor associated with support for violent extremism among women as well.

In community meetings, focus groups and interviews, most participants felt that there was little justice or equality for women and girls in Libya. Serious gaps exist in the family law system, which both increase women's vulnerability and are politicised by violent extremist groups. For instance, violent extremist groups as well as Islamists have successfully drawn

on societal discriminatory attitudes toward women, especially among men, to build political movements against women's human rights.

The relegation of women to subordinate roles in the family and community is shifting, however. Research participants stated that **extremist groups seek to stigmatise changing gender roles and use threats of gender-based violence and female dishonour because they see empowered women as a threat.** Around half of our research participants agreed that gender-based violence could drive women to join violent extremist groups. Women's experiences of violence may influence them to either reject or support violent extremist groups. In the survey, 39 per cent of respondents thought rape was a factor pushing women to join violent extremist groups.

As well, a majority of women respondents (59 per cent) disagreed with honour-based violence against daughters and sisters, compared with 37 per cent of men who disagreed with it. Indeed, a significant number of men (41 per cent) agreed on the use of violence to punish a girl for bringing dishonour on the family, compared to 24 per cent of women who agreed to the use of honour-based violence.

## 1.2

### **Violent extremist groups use financial incentives to radicalize men and women to violence, playing into masculine gender norms of breadwinning, leadership, and women's economic vulnerability.**

Financial motivations to join violent extremist groups work in complex ways in the context of a war economy in Libya. Paid work in militia and extremist groups was seen as a strong pull factor by many interviewed in field research, and violent extremist groups use the imperative of male protection of women to recruit male and female members. Half of all survey respondents in this study agreed or strongly agreed that men should sacrifice their wellbeing to support the women in their lives. This social expectation that men will work for wages to support a family increases the attraction of the financial incentives offered by violent extremist groups. Among survey respondents 60 per cent of men and 55 per cent of women agreed that “men join a violent extremist group because that group offers them money” (Q41). Ascribing financial motivation to male violent extremists was stronger than for female violent extremists.

Such recruitment strategies make sense given that male leadership of the public sphere has wide support among men. More than two thirds of male respondents in our survey (69 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that religious leadership should be in the hands of men. By contrast, slightly less than a third of female respondents (31 per cent) agreed with this notion, demonstrating a significant gender gap in support for gender women's leadership or gender equality in the public sphere. More than three quarters of male respondents (78 per cent) and two thirds of female respondents (69 per cent) agreed that women need a male guardian to protect the honour of the family.

## 1.3

### **Recruitment messaging in traditional and online media is distinctively tailored to men and women.**

Traditional and online media, including social media, are an important vector for spreading extremist ideologies, and a medium of individual recruitment. Recruitment messaging of violent extremist groups appeals to Libyan men's sense of masculine dominance over women as fighters,

breadwinners and decision-makers. Many community meeting and focus group participants reported having seen online terrorist recruitment. A notable minority of male (13 per cent) and female (12 per cent) survey respondents also reported seeing recruitment to violent groups online. This is significant given the relatively low internet access in Libya.

Strikingly, eleven per cent of women respondents reported seeing violence against women and girls online “very often” compared to just three per cent of men; seven per cent of men compared with fifteen per cent of women stated they have seen violence against women and girls “frequently” online. This finding could be interpreted in relation to men's support for violence against women and its correlation with support for violent extremism.

## 1.4

### **Kinship relations are formalised in a system of legal inequality where men are legally**

heads of household. These kin relations including sexual relations, female subordination in marriage, forced marriage, hierarchical mother-son relations – affect violent extremism. Gendered power relations are exploited by violent extremist groups in their recruitment strategies. Women who are subordinate to and/or dependent on male relatives who are members of violent extremist groups are likely to be recruited by those relatives. Once married to an extremist, women and girls experience financial insecurity and social stigma if they seek to separate from or divorce their spouses.

Some mothers join violent extremist groups, sacrificing their own rights, to be with their sons who are members whereas other women are coerced into joining by family members. Some women are proud of the financial gains and moral status they have accrued as a result of family connections to these groups.

At the same time as kinship is a major pull factor for violent extremism, the lack of—or dysfunctional—kinship relations have also been used by violent extremist groups to recruit members. Violent extremist groups target excluded and vulnerable women, especially spinsters, widows, and divorcees for recruitment. Several community meeting and focus

group research participants mentioned that violent extremist groups focus their recruitment efforts on poor and vulnerable women.

The degree of women's oppression varies from place to place. Ajdabiya was highlighted as an area with high levels of inequality between men and women, as well as societal support for gender segregation in public and private spheres. These structures and attitudes explain the rise of gender regressive religious schools and women-only koranic study groups in that region.

One academic expert in our research noted that isolation through oppression explained why women in Ajdabiya joined violent extremist groups. In her words, "oppression is a factor in recruitment in Ajdabiya because women do not go out at all."

### 1.5

**The spread of intolerance and discriminatory gender ideology is associated with the rise of religious schools,** increasing in number due to the deregulated, underfunded and/or absent state schooling system. The dominance of religious schools enforcing the segregation and subordination of women was seen as particularly concerning in the south of Libya, where government reach was weakest. Women-only koranic study groups promote 'gender regressive' and violent extremist ideologies. Since 2011, many such study groups are dominated by ideas promoting violence, women's subordination and the restriction of women's human rights.

Religious schools and koranic study groups are also sites of recruitment, largely because the conflict in Libya has resulted in limited regulation, supervision, and/or democratic oversight. Licenses for private schools are not monitored while the curriculum in public schools also promotes discriminatory gender norms and religious intolerance. Parents are largely unaware of the curriculum content being taught in private or public schools. Educational reform is constrained by the current conflict and a lack of oversight and regulation of school funding, management and curriculum contributes to violent extremism and gender inequality.

### 1.6

**Attacks on women's rights actors is an early warning sign of violence and women seek to counter and prevent violent extremism by advocating for women's rights.** There is an important trend of women seeking to prevent and counter violent extremism by advocating for women's rights. Standing up for their rights motivates some women to resist violent extremist groups. Research participants gave examples of how women's efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism in their families and communities increasingly put them at risk. Almost all participants in Sabha, Benghazi, and Tripoli stated that they knew of violence targeted at women leaders. That violence took many forms; violent extremist groups were known to use extortion, blackmail, and smear campaigns to obstruct women leaders specifically.

In the survey, 40 per cent of female respondents agreed that attacks on women leaders were signs of impending militia attack compared to 33 per cent of men. 27 per cent of women strongly agreed with the statement: "I can tell when there will be extremist violence because the militia will start to attack women leaders" compared to 19 per cent of men.

These six research findings are further analysed throughout the research report. Recommendations based on these findings are highlighted for government, civil society and external actors engaged in efforts to counter terrorism, and to counter and prevent violent extremism in Libya and the North Africa region. Taken together, they urge all actors to consider the importance of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and its implementation in Libya. The WPS framework is crucial to address the gender dynamics and attraction of violent extremism, especially the systemic gender inequality and discrimination that provides a fertile ground for radicalization to violence, the use of gender-based violence as a tactic of violent extremist groups, and the limited spaces for women's participation in the countering and prevention responses to violent extremism.

## 2.0

# RESEARCH BACKGROUND

Challenges associated with the presence and spread of violent extremism in Libya are significant for both men and women. However, women have little voice or political space to contribute to formal efforts to prevent and resolve violent conflict. Civil war, battles for control over vast oil resources, regional conflicts, illicit trade, political support of militias, politicization of divorce, migration issues, marriage and inheritance laws, as well as gender-based violence have all fueled support for violent extremism.

Women have been at the frontlines of advocating for women's rights and against extremism for at least a decade in Libya. The 2011 revolution began as the mothers, wives and children of prisoners massacred at Abu Salim prison (fifteen years earlier in 1996) took to the streets of Benghazi to demand freedom for their lawyer who had been imprisoned by the Gadhafi regime. Women's prominence in the revolution led many women and men to believe that the revolution would bring empowerment for Libyan women. There was a qualified embrace of equal rights and new political space in Libya for a period of 18 months after the revolution. Mandated political quotas, at relatively low levels, for women were included in the first elections, for instance, although remain disputed to this day. Following the revolution, many women felt the new political circumstances would be a catalyst for social, economic, and political empowerment for women. That hard-won freedom was forestalled by the Libyan Civil War that set back Libyan women's struggle for equality and empowerment. The expansion of warring parties, militia, and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)-Libya has magnified the distance between women and men. Violent extremism has capitalized on gender discrimination and inequality to increase its appeal to men seeking power and women seeking protection.<sup>1</sup>

The international community has recognized the efforts of Libyan women's rights activists to prevent and resolve conflict in the context of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. However, implementation of WPS on the ground is uneven, and absent from UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya.

Gender-regressive ideologies are society-wide phenomena in Libya, and not confined to violent extremist groups such as ISIS. The Tobruk and Tripoli governments have also promoted some gender-regressive policies such as guardianship laws. Another partisan, General Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army militia, has supported men's legal guardianship over women. Islamist actors' goals in Libya (*inter alia*: the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood and the Justice and Construction Party; The Watan Party; Salafists; Grand Mufti Ghariani) include Sharia-based family law, gender segregation, male guardianship over women, and exclusion of women from paid work. ISIS in Libya aims to "prevent the formation of a reunified Libyan state, secure control over the country's critical resources and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in Libya". Libyan women have also supported gender regressive groups. Some of this support is pragmatic: given widespread insecurity, those parts of the state with strong military ties "enter into a protection racket with women who exchange protection for silence".<sup>2</sup>

## 2.1 Current Political Context

Following elections in 2012 and 2014, two rival governments arose: the first in Tripoli (Western Libya), then after 2014, one in Tobruk (Eastern Libya). Both the Tobruk and Tripoli rival governments faced challenges to state rule from organized violent extremist groups with affiliations to ISIS in Libya and Al Qaeda, especially in border regions in the east and south. In December 2015, the UN brokered a ceasefire between the

Tobruk and Tripoli factions under the Libyan Political Agreement granting power to the Tripoli group. However, tensions between the Tobruk and Tripoli factions have continued. Rival factions in the unity government continue to have links to militia, armed groups and violent extremists, making the control of violent extremism politically and economically difficult. Widespread conflict, deprivation, and attacks on civilians by various armed forces, militia, and violent extremists continue. In an emerging situation, with the focus of the government forces on Tripoli since April, there is also a fear that the extremist groups will try to take over the South, if left unprotected.<sup>3</sup>

The period since the 2011 revolution in Libya has been characterized by the absence of functioning state institutions including an accountable military with a monopoly on the use of force. Proliferation and availability of arms threatens the stability of the country. As of 2018, the Government of National Accord controls the majority of the Western Region including Tripoli, Misrata, Sirte and Sabha, as well as some of the border region of Tunisia (West Libya). The Libyan National Army militia under the control

of General Haftar has territorial control of much of the central and eastern regions including the cities of Benghazi, Derna, Tobruk and Ajdabiya (East Libya). ISIS still controls some areas between Benghazi and Ajdabiya, and a sizeable area south of Sirte and Misrata (Central Libya). Finally, Tebu militias control substantial tracts of the Sahara in the South bordering Niger and Chad, while Tuareg militias dominate the southwest borderlands with Algeria, including the cities of Ghat and Awbar (South Libya). In April 2019, General Haftar launched an air and ground attack on Tripoli where the United Nations-supported Government of National Accord is based.<sup>4</sup>

The next section describes the research design and methodology as well as the significant security challenges in undertaking research in Libya. The following section discusses the six main research findings. The final section of the report considers the implications of the research findings for supporting women's efforts to prevent violent extremism and recommendations from these findings for key Libyan, regional and international actors.

## 3.0

# RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

There are general theories explaining the rise of violent extremism that focus on material or economic-type factors versus political-ideological and/or religion-based factors. Country-specific factors leading to extremism and violent extremism in Libya are highly relevant, and to some extent, every story of radicalization is unique. To date, none of these general or region-specific theories have considered the role of gender identities, dynamics and ideology in the spread of violent extremism, and whether or not there are gender differences with respect to recruitment and mobilisation patterns, the impacts of violent extremism, and efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism. In light of this neglect of the gender dimensions of violent extremism, the research project on which this report is based set out to build an evidence-base.

Crucially, the research tests the hypothesis that gender inequality is a factor in the spread of violent extremism, and that it interacts with other factors such as economic inequality and grievances, political inequality and lack of voice, and religious intolerance to increase the support for violent extremism.

Researchers working from a gender perspective took a broader view of extremism in Libya than is typical among mainstream analysts to ensure it covered non-Islamic State groups and militias who have extremist views of women, democracy, and the state that potentially condone or promote the use of violence.

The research design sought to identify specific drivers and enablers of radicalization and violent extremism (considering socio-economic, political, security,

ideological and other factors and how they interrelate); ways in which such threats are prevented, countered and otherwise responded to; and the gender dynamics therein.

The methodology informing the qualitative research project is grounded, interpretivist, and feminist research. The collaborative approach enables researchers to ascertain what respondents themselves consider to be important when examining the gendered dynamics of violent extremism, including ways in which women and men are mobilized or radicalized, engaged in mobilization and radicalization, and participate in efforts to prevent and counter their threat. Grounded and feminist approaches are also appropriate when investigating the differential experiences of violent extremism and perceptions of threat and opportunity.

## RADICALIZATION

1. Are there gender differences in the patterns of recruitment and mobilization to violent extremism?
2. What gender-specific drivers and enablers of violent extremism can we observe in communities?
3. What are the gender-specific indicators of increased radicalization and potential for violent extremism?

## ROLES

4. What specifically is the nature of women's engagement in the perpetration of violent extremism and terrorism?
5. What are the diverse roles of women and women's organizations in preventing and countering violent extremism indirectly as well as directly?

## IMPACT

6. To what extent are there gender differences in the impacts of terrorism and violent extremism on women and men in communities?
7. To what extent are gender perspectives mainstreamed effectively in national and regional counter terrorism, and preventing and countering violent extremism policies, strategies and practices?
8. How can preventing and countering violent extremism policies and strategies become more gender-responsive?

### 3.1 Selection of Research Sites

The research was conducted in four sites in different subregions of Libya, which represent the four major regions of Libya. All four sites have had different experiences of conflict from higher risk to lower risk areas, and help the research to gain a 'maximum variation', that is the most comprehensive view of the security situation from a gender perspective. Some of the sites have been sites of militia violence, others are deeply conservative or tied tightly to the political economies of resource extraction, and others were taken over by avowed violent extremists. Including areas such as Sabha allows the research to gain insight into the more isolated, borderland areas and the specific gender dynamics therein. In 2018, ISIS had a strong presence in western Libya, especially south of Sirte and Tripoli. For that reason, Sirte was not one of the fieldwork sites.

**Benghazi** is a coastal city of around 600,000 people in eastern Libya, the second major city in Libya. Historically, it has been a second capital of

the country, and the site of significant cultural heritage. Shortly after the 2011 revolution, violent extremist group Ansar Al Sharia attacked American compounds in Benghazi. During the Second Libyan Civil War, Benghazi was taken over by ISIS and the coalition of Islamist militias, the Benghazi Revolutionaries' Shurah Council. The partisan Libyan National Army militia defeated these groups in July 2017, led by General Haftar. Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and Darnah Mujahidin Shura Council continue to fight Haftar's Libyan National Army militia in the East. Benghazi has been a site of severe violence and torture.<sup>5</sup>

**Ajdabiya** is a small sized coastal city south of Benghazi. In the First Libyan Civil War, it was one of the first cities held by rebels against Gadhafi's forces. Subsequently taken over by Islamists backed by the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood and extremist groups, Ajdabiya was overtaken by the Libyan National Army in 2016. Fighting continues in Ajdabiya between ISIS and the Libyan National Army militia with dozens of deaths on both sides. Ajdaibya is part of the "oil crescent" of Libya, the location of many of the oil export terminals.<sup>6</sup>

**Tripoli** is the capital of Libya, and its largest city. Tripoli and surrounding areas of Western Libya including Sirte, have the highest number of active non-state militia of any region in Libya. These militia include tribal and ethnic militia, or city-based militia (Zintan militia; Misrata militia), usually only active in one or two areas; that is, very localized. Over the last few years, ISIS engaged in more fighting and violence in Western Libya than they did in other regions of Libya. Scholars argue that large numbers of militias acting as city based “local security providers” tax collectors or political goons drive the violence in Western Libya.<sup>7</sup>

**Sabha** is an oasis town in South West Libya, with a population of 130,000 people, over 600 kilometers south of Tripoli. It has been particularly prone to violence in the period 2016-2019, with ongoing fighting between Tebu and Tuareg groups, Chadian groups, ISIS, Al Qaeda-backed militia and the Libyan National Army militia. Recent clashes in the South (Sabha) between the ethnic minority Tebu supported by foreign actors such as Chad, underline the vulnerability of Libya for interregional conflicts. According to research participants at the community meeting, the history of militant groups in the South began in 1994, when the Mujahadeen Brigades recruited youth in the South, before changing their name to Jamaa Moukatila (the militant group).<sup>8</sup>

Research participants also attributed instability and insecurities in Sabha to armed conflict between different kinship groups. Participants named the groups involved in the conflict as “the sons of Solomon (Awlad Suleiman) and the Khathada, and the sons of Solomon and Tebu”.<sup>9</sup> The Tebu have a history of conflict with the Arab majority in Libya and with the Tuareg, and have established militia to fight for more ‘inclusion’ and an end to marginalization. Participants likewise pointed to the frontier of the South which attracts armed groups from countries on the southern border like Chad, Niger, Sudan and others. They suggested that “the aggression of the Chadian armed groups and the Tebu pushed many youths to join Salafi-aligned extremist groups, especially in the cities of Sabha and Aubari where many dormant cells [of ISIS and Al Qaeda] exist.”<sup>10</sup>

Growing illegal immigration is exploited by extremist armed groups, in particular, for drug and human trafficking. Tebu and Tuareg smugglers facilitate migrants’ crossing of Libya’s southern border. According to a UN Security Council report, “Tebu leaders, such as Adamu Tchéké and Abu Bakr al-Suqi, collect tolls in cash for travel from the border to Sabha”.

### 3.2 Field Research

The field research data was collected during fieldwork undertaken by Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre’s Libyan research partner - a team of Libyan academics led by Dr Oum Elezz of the University of Benghazi from October 2018 to March 2019.

The three-person Libyan team had access to local researchers in Western, Eastern and Central regions of Libya. The Libyan team has deep and long-term links with the university community, students and academics. Universities are key sites of both radicalization and prevention of violent extremism. Their long-term involvement in civil society and women’s empowerment allow them to engage meaningfully with communities, and was important to assessing the validity and rigour of the data. The research findings, derived from local expertise, are quite unique.

The first stage of field research data collection was community meetings in each of the field sites to generally discuss the research topic with the aim of validating the research questions. A cross-section of the community, with a focus on gatekeepers and experts, was invited to take part in an initial community meeting in each site. Overall, 119 people attended community meetings; this number was higher than expected due to two community meetings being held in Tripoli (see Table 1).

**TABLE 1:**  
**Research Participants**

Site	Community Meeting participants		FGD participants		KII participants		Total participants
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
Benghazi	5	9	6	23	4	10	57
Ajdabiya	7	3	1	14	5	8	38
Tripoli (2 community meetings in Tripoli)	18	53	17	23	4	18	133
Sabha	7	17	2	32	7	17	82
<b>Gender disaggregation across sites</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>310</b>

In the second phase, focus group discussions were held in each site, involving 118 participants (see Table 1). Some focus groups were segregated by gender to ensure women-only spaces for data collection, which is particularly important in conflict-affected zones with high levels of sexism and gender-based violence. Some were mixed with people of different ages, backgrounds and socio-economic groups to gain a sense of community dynamics. Key informant interviews in Benghazi were largely drawn from legal professionals and those with expertise.

Confidential key informant interviews were conducted in all four sites. These were the most effective field research method used in Libya, due to security and confidentiality concerns. They enabled women and men to more safely share their knowledge and perspectives. Fifty-three women, and 20 men were interviewed by the Libya research team.

Field research sought to over-represent women and their perspectives given the research questions about women's roles in violent extremism and its prevention, and the lesser data and knowledge on women's roles, as well as gender dynamics, in the research literature. The field research findings were validated during a workshop with Libyan and international gender experts.

### 3.3 Survey Research

The survey for this research project was carried out between March and June 2019. The survey research questions investigated the same themes as the field research, aiming to triangulate field research findings and provide a more categorical analysis of the relationship between attitudes toward gender equality and women in particular, and support for violent extremism.

#### Sample

Table 2 reports the Libyan survey respondents by gender, age and region. We aimed for 50:50 gender split in survey responses using a random selection of available respondents and an equal split across the West, East and South of Libya. We aimed for over-representation of youth (18-25 years) in the survey because youth are known to be most vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups. As well as gender, age and region, certain quotas were applied to ensure a good representation across education level, marital status, employment status and monthly income to avoid any major skew towards any sub category in each group.

**TABLE 2:**  
**Survey Respondents**

Region	Gender and age									
	Male					Female				
	18 - 25	25-35	35-45	> 45	Total	18 - 25	25-35	35-45	> 45	Total
West	106	93	60	35	294	133	116	26	14	289
	57.6	58.5	57.7	58.3	58.0	53.6	65.9	47.3	66.7	57.8
East	49	38	24	15	126	49	33	20	5	107
	26.6	23.9	23.1	25.0	24.9	19.8	18.8	36.4	23.8	21.4
South	29	28	20	10	87	66	27	9	2	104
	15.8	17.6	19.2	16.7	17.2	26.6	15.3	16.4	9.5	20.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>500</b>

The survey instrument in English is included in Appendix A. The survey questions examined social media use, and religiosity, and sought to measure sexism and violence against women, which are considered part of the construction of gender identities, and therefore used as variables in the survey. The questions on violent extremism probed the same topic in a variety of ways in order to be sure of a respondent's views.

Survey responses were on a five-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree, for instance. Given the cultural, religious and regional sensitivities involved in conducting the survey, "prefer not to answer" was an option added for most of the questions. The addition of the "prefer not to answer" was key to our approval for the survey in the field.

For the questions on sexism, the scale is drawn from the Glick and Fiske ambivalent sexism scale, which allows researchers to examine the multidimensional nature of sexism which has both hostile and benevolent aspects.<sup>12</sup> This scale has been extensively tested across cultures and countries. Researchers hypothesised that increased support for hostile sexism would be correlated with increased violent

extremism. A second hypothesis was that women would be more inclined to support benevolent sexism, rather than hostile sexism. The third hypothesis was that support for violence against women would correlate with both support for violent extremism and support for hostile sexism.<sup>13</sup> A scale of support for violence against women was constructed, dividing questions on attitudes supportive of physical and sexual violence against women and on attitudes supportive of practices that harm women and girls (female genital mutilation, child marriage, bride price, and so-called honour-based violence). This enabled the reliability of the results to be analysed. All scales are described in the Appendices.

Our survey analysis reports gender and age disaggregated frequencies to describe different groups' attitudes towards violent extremism, sexism and violence against women. The study then used statistical analysis to determine the strength and direction of the association between different factors affecting support for violent extremism such as masculinity, education, religiosity, age, income, employment, gender, hostile and benevolent sexism, and support for violence against women.<sup>14</sup> The regression analysis tables appear in Appendix J.

### 3.4 Challenges and Limitations

Human subjects' research ethics approval was granted by the Monash University Research Ethics Committee (MUHREC). This project committed to ensuring that researchers were safe and guided by the principle of "do no harm" with respect to research participants as well as the researchers themselves. To the credit of the skills and trust engendered by the Libyan National Research partner, rich data was able to be collected despite the fragile situation in the four research sites.

Field research for this report was carried out from September to December 2018, while the survey took place concurrently with the current conflict between March and June 2019.

In Tripoli and Sabha, the team faced uncertainties and constantly changing security conditions because of the proliferation of weapons. Logistically, there were significant problems with flight cancellations and delays from Tripoli to Sabha. The reality of doing research in conflict-affected areas means that field research is often not welcomed by community members. People are reluctant, in general, to fill out questionnaires or answer questions. In the South (Sabha), interviewing people about sensitive subjects like gender relations and violent extremism required great tact and care from the Libyan field researchers. Given the dynamics of young men and women's

involvement in extremism and illicit activities in the South, it was difficult to overcome the reluctance of young people to answer questions about extremism. Communication from all team members (research leads, country teams, regional teams) could have been clearer, and the lack of reliable internet and phone connectivity sometimes impeded effective communication.

In Benghazi and Ajdabiya, the team faced a different set of circumstances concerning the dynamics of research in conflict-affected environments. Country team leaders had hoped to interview to at least some women involved in violent extremism. However, by late 2018, many of them left Benghazi and Ajdabiya to join their families. Those who were in the city, whether in Ajdabiya or Benghazi, categorically refused to be interviewed despite reassurances of confidentiality, because they were scared for their parents and children. In Benghazi, the team needed to obtain a great number of security approvals; an exhausting process that needed much sensitivity. Some officials and figures close to religious institutions were obstructive about interview dates and times.

Survey responses from some locations (including Sirte and Derna) were unavailable due to the ongoing conflict, while the survey was being conducted March through June 2019. Likewise, Sirte was not a site for field research because of the ongoing conflict.

## 4.0

# RESEARCH FINDINGS

There are six main research findings from the mixed-method research project.

### 4.1

#### Finding 1:

#### Violence Against Women & Support for Violent Extremism

Crucially, analysis of the correlations in the survey data suggests there is a relationship between violence against women and violent extremism. Across the whole sample, there was a moderate, positive and significant relationship between support for violence against women and support for violent extremism (0.304).<sup>15</sup> Survey analysis revealed that attitudes supporting or condoning violence against women are the only statistically significant factor positively associated with support for violent extremism. In other words, people who support violence against women are much more likely to support violent extremism. No other variable (age, religion, gender, education, employment, and religiosity) was associated with support for violent extremism. This finding is a pattern across the whole population surveyed, as well youth (18-25 years) and adults (25+) as disaggregated groups. The pattern of association was more pronounced among men as a group than women as a group.

In addition, there were also significant and moderate relationships between support for violence against women and support for cultural practices that harm women and girls (0.558), hostile (.206) and benevolent sexism (0.205). These are not causal relationships per

se as that would require further substantiation of mechanisms connecting them in empirical research which would be extremely difficult to do in a context such as Libya. However, the fact that people's attitudes towards these types of violence - violence against women and violent extremism – does show there is a tangible connection between them that is likely to manifest in different ways in Libya. For instance, acceptance of violence against women and girls may contribute to support for violent extremism and be an early warning sign for the spread of violent extremism. It makes logical sense that violence against women and girls is an integral part of violent extremism, first, because violence against women is a tool for violent extremist groups to recruit men, and second, is part of recruitment of women through threats and blackmail.

With respect to the relationship between hostile or benign sexist attitudes toward women and violent extremism, 34 per cent of men and 43 per cent of women agreed that men join extremist groups because of their sexist ideologies. On the other hand, 39 per cent of women and 45 per cent of men disagreed or strongly disagreed with the claim that men join violent extremist groups because of sexism, for instance, as expressed through a desire for domination over women. The hypothesis, that some men join extremist groups because they are motivated by a desire for domination over women or other sexist motivations that such groups promote, was supported by a significant number (386) of survey respondents (39 per cent).

Child marriage had been “legalized” by violent extremist groups: “They made marriage of minors okay, and they lowered the age of marriage”.  
Female Academic Expert, Benghazi

**TABLE 3**

**Men join violent extremist groups because they support ideas like “women should be obedient to their husbands”**

Q37.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	28%	21%	25%
2	16%	17%	17%
3	17%	14%	16%
4	25%	26%	26%
Strongly agree	9%	16%	13%
Prefer not to answer	4%	5%	4%

Escaping gender-based violence can push women to join violent extremist groups  
 Woman Interviewee, Sabha

Many research participants acknowledged that “women suffer a lot from injustice and abuse”.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, a number of respondents mentioned gender-based violence as one of their main grievances: “Local suffering: Gender-based violence against women and their children”.<sup>17</sup> As yet, there are no legal institutional mechanisms to address this violence. There is little justice for women victims of gender-based violence.<sup>18</sup>

Gender-regressive ideology manifests in and justifies violence against women and girls. Extremist groups in Libya legalized child marriage in areas under their control, such as Sirte.<sup>19</sup> Focus group participants in Ajdabiya said that child marriage had been “legalised” by violent extremist groups there too: “They made marriage of minors okay, and they lowered the age of marriage”.<sup>20</sup> One participant in Ajdabiya said that extremists sought

to promote damaging ideas that “had nothing to do with Islam” such as “legalising and justifying incest”.<sup>21</sup> In the field research sites, participants had mixed views about the role of gender-based violence in fueling extremism. Around half of interviewees agreed gender-based violence could drive women to join violent extremist groups. As one woman from Sabha put it: “escaping violence is one of the factors that attract women to extremist fundamentalist groups”,<sup>22</sup> or equally “escaping gender-based violence can push women to join violent extremist groups”.<sup>23</sup> One interviewee attributed this driver to the fact that “women do not know their rights in legislation”.<sup>24</sup>

In the survey, 39 per cent of respondents thought rape was a factor pushing women to join violent extremist groups.

**TABLE 4:**

**Women who have been raped or sexually abused are more likely to join a violent extremist group**

Q43.	Percent
Strongly disagree	17%
2	19%
3	18%
4	28%
Strongly agree	12%
Prefer not to answer	7%

Domestic violence was also seen as a factor motivating for women to join such groups for 42 per cent of respondents. Only minimal gender differences were observed on these questions.

**TABLE 5:****Women who face violence from their husbands, fathers, or brothers are more likely to join a violent extremist group**

Q42.	Percent
Strongly disagree	16%
2	17%
3	18%
4	31%
Strongly agree	10%
Prefer not to answer	6%

A significant number of men (41 per cent) agreed on the use of violence to punish a girl for bringing dishonour on the family, compared to 24 per cent of women who agreed to the use of honour based violence

A majority of female survey respondents (59 per cent) disagreed with honour-based violence against daughters and sisters, compared with 37 per cent of male respondents who disagreed with it. Indeed, a significant number of men (41 per cent) agreed on the use of violence to punish a girl for bringing dishonour on the family, compared to 24 per cent of women who agreed to the use of honour-based violence.

Survey analysis revealed that 71 per cent of women compared to 60 per cent of men disagreed that

“husbands can ever be justified in using physical violence against wives” (Q8o). Most people disagreed that a man can use physical force against his wife, however, there were significant gender differences in the responses of women and men. When asked whether domestic violence was justified in a context of wifely disobedience, a third of men (34 per cent) compared to a minority of women (22 per cent) supported a man’s use of violence in such a context (see Table 6).

**TABLE 6:****A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him**

Q83.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	28%	45%	36%
2	20%	18%	19%
3	15%	11%	13%
4	22%	15%	18%
Strongly agree	12%	7%	10%
Prefer not to answer	3%	4%	3%

Gender differences in responses regarding attitudes to marital rape could also be observed. A significant number of men strongly disagreed (29 per cent) or disagreed (22 per cent) with marital rape. A significant number of women strongly disagreed

(38 per cent) or disagreed (19 per cent) with marital rape. A significant minority of men (28 per cent) and women (27 per cent) thought men were entitled to sex within marriage, even if a wife didn't want to (see Table 7).

**TABLE 7:**  
**The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to**

Q86.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	29%	38%	34%
2	22 %	19 %	20%
3	16 %	11 %	14%
4	16%	17 %	16%
Strongly agree	12%	10%	11%
Prefer not to answer	6%	5%	6%

The survey showed widespread acceptance of violence against women from both men and women, with statistically significant gender differences. Across all questions on violence against women, only 32 per cent of men showed no support for any kind of violence against women, compared to 42 per cent of women.<sup>25</sup> A large majority, 67 per cent of men, indicated any support for violence against women compared to 57 per cent of women. On average, approximately six out of ten Libyans agreed that there are some situations in which violence against women can be justified.

Our results show a slightly lower, but comparable rate of acceptance of violence against women to a survey conducted in Libya in 2013.<sup>26</sup> The earlier study by Rola Abdul Latif showed high levels of acceptance of domestic violence, with seven out of ten Libyans agreeing that there are situations where domestic violence can be justified. In that survey, older women rejected domestic violence more strongly than younger women did.

**TABLE 8:**  
**Indicated any support to any question concerning violence against women**

Indicated any support to any question concerning violence against women	Male	Female	Total
No support	32%	42%	37%
Any Support	67%	57%	62%
Prefer not to answer	1%	1%	1%

## Empowered Women are Seen as a Threat

Most interviewees in Tripoli thought that violent extremist groups were concerned with these changing gender roles as outlined above.<sup>27</sup> Most participants agreed that extremist groups were concerned about changing gender roles; because empowered women posed a threat to them. A majority of participants across all four sites agreed that extremist groups were “worried”, “deeply concerned”<sup>28</sup> or “anxious”<sup>29</sup> about these changes.

Extremist groups are convinced that women’s role is and should be limited because violent extremist groups have a backward mentality that dates back to the dark ages.

Male Tribal Elder, Benghazi

Some participants ascribed fear of women’s empowerment to extremists’ backwardness. A Libyan tribal elder from Benghazi explained: “Extremist groups are convinced that women’s role is and should be limited because violent extremist groups have a backward mentality that dates back to the dark ages”.<sup>30</sup> Likewise, a male lecturer in Ajdabiya also suggested that extremist groups had gender-regressive views, out of place in a modern world: “Of course [extremist groups are concerned]; they have their ideology, which assign to women very limited roles in society. These violent extremist groups want to go back to the dark ages”.<sup>31</sup>

Extremist groups in Libya have a number of gender regressive aims. These comprise: the installation of Sharia Law, including family law; Islamic criminal law; guardianship of men over women; separation of the sexes in the public domain (transportation, schools/ universities); exclusion of women from paid work except for limited amount of social work; the extension of the Qur’anic school system.<sup>32</sup>

The presence of women in public bodies poses a great danger to them [violent extremists]. The presence of women and their awareness in the country is dangerous [to them] because it can have a positive impact on all society

Female Legal Professional, Benghazi

Some research participants pointed to the threat women’s empowerment held for extremist groups. A female participant in Benghazi argued that “some extremist groups are very concerned about the change [in gender roles] because it is not in their favour. The change exists but they cannot stop it, so they are worried”.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, a female legal professional in Benghazi said that, “the presence of women in public bodies poses a great danger to them. The presence of women and their awareness in the country is dangerous because it can have a positive impact on all society”.<sup>34</sup> A female politician in Benghazi also noted: “Extremist groups fear many women leaders. They try to limit their influence and eliminate them. The groups always resort to limiting the role of women to traditional roles so to constrain their power and influence in society”.<sup>35</sup> One participant said: “No matter women’s position in violent extremist groups, they are afraid of women leaders in society”.<sup>36</sup> Violent extremists also respond to empowered women with violence, as discussed in later sections.

Because violent extremist groups reject enlightened women, gender inequality may motivate women to either fight extremism or become part of it

Woman Interviewee, Sabha

It is important to note that regressive gender dynamics can work against and for violent extremist groups. One interviewee insightfully noted: “Because violent extremist groups reject enlightened women, gender inequality may motivate women to either fight extremism or become part of it”.<sup>37</sup> Violent extremism makes women’s status an issue—and the politicisation motivates both recruitment, and efforts to prevent violent extremism.

Important in the context of Libya is that the mobilization against women’s rights is part of the political repertoire of extremists. The legal sphere has been an area of gender progressive and regressive mobilization around marriage, divorce, and inheritance since the 2011 revolution.<sup>38</sup> Prior to 2011, a legal pluralist system meant that Sharia Law was applied in family law matters and non-Sharia Law was used in other matters. Sharia Law was administered through the civil system rather than religious courts, however.<sup>39</sup> To this day, there is no unified family law system, and Sharia Law still applies in matters of family law (personal status laws).<sup>40</sup> The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs ensures all religious practices conform to state approved Islamic norms.<sup>41</sup>

Extremist groups, as well as Islamist political parties and groupings, have mobilized against women’s rights. For instance, in the years

immediately following Libya’s revolution, the Grand Mufti Sadiq Al-Ghariani, close to the GNC government, called for gender segregation across all of Libya.<sup>42</sup> Extremist and fundamentalist groups, as well as mainstream Islamist groups, have mobilized around the legalisation of polygamy. Before 2011, polygamy required a first wife to give consent in front of a court. In 2011, the leader of the Transnational National Council, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, signaled he would legalise polygamy in order to placate Islamist groups.<sup>43</sup> Polygamy was legalised in 2013.<sup>44</sup> Unsurprisingly perhaps, Libyan men support polygamy in much higher numbers than women do.<sup>45</sup>

Interviews with legal professionals in Benghazi showed that women’s professional roles in the legal field are considered to be under threat from extremists. According to a focus group with legal professionals in Ajdabiya, some groups were working to excluded women from taking any decisions in the divorce process. As a female prison officer in Benghazi told researchers, “the way society looks at divorced women is very bad, which is very hard if she is young and has to raise kids”.<sup>46</sup> The group saw this as a “prelude to removing women from the judiciary”.<sup>47</sup> As discussed later in this research report, criticism of these gender injustices in the legal sphere has resulted in killings and violence against women’s rights activists.

The way society looks at divorced women is very bad, which is very hard if she is young and has to raise kids.

Female Prison Officer, Benghazi

## RECOMMENDATIONS

An overall strategy to tackle these two overlapping forms of violence (violence against women and violent extremism) is required:

- It will be important to find examples of good practice from other countries in raising awareness on violence against women. There is a need to frame the campaign with respect to drivers of radicalisation to violence and violent extremism since the threat of violence against women is often used to promote extremism and recruitment to violent extremism. Addressing potential female victims of violent extremism – to raise awareness of their rights – including rights to protection, would also be an important part of an anti-violence campaign. As above, this would be strengthened through reference to the Protection pillar of the Women Peace and Security agenda. Moreover, because of the gender-blind way people view violence, an awareness raising campaign on the overlaps of violence against women and extremist violence to encourage parliamentarians to change discriminatory laws should be piloted.
- Provide education on violence committed against women, to teach women about the laws that protect them and support them using examples of good practices from other countries in the region. For Libyan government agencies' this would include strengthening laws criminalizing violence against women, and reform of sections of law that condone violence against women
- More institutions (women's shelters and safe spaces) providing care and protection for victims of gender-based violence are required Given the overlap of support for violence against women and violent extremism, security sector actors need to see violence on a continuum, rather than violence against women as a private matter between men and women, and address it accordingly.

## 4.2

### Finding 2:

#### Violent Extremist Groups Use Financial Incentives & Gender Norms to Radicalize Men and Women

Research participants reported that violent extremist groups use the imperative of male protection of women. According to participants in Ajdabiya, ISIS focuses on recruiting men, and then recruits their female family members. Once they have control over women, if the men waver, they can blackmail the men by threatening to use violence against his female family members: “In this context, they can take the husband and blackmail and threaten him”.<sup>48</sup> However, a significant number of women in Sabha described male leadership in terms of domination, rather than protection. For example, a 34-year-old

woman from Sabha said: “The role of men comprises the love of domination and marginalisation of women”.<sup>49</sup> Another older woman from Sabha opined that the [old fashioned] “Typical role of man is *Se Sayed*” (*Arabic: Master*),<sup>50</sup> while another said: “The typical role of men is control”.<sup>51</sup> Again, male dominance of women referenced men’s paid work: “Men dominate women and work outside the house, women work inside the house”.<sup>52</sup>

Supporting these findings from the field research, the survey asked about religious leadership and found a large majority of male respondents (80 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that “religious leadership should be in the hands of men”. By contrast, women (54 per cent) agreed with this notion, demonstrating a large gender gap in support for women’s leadership in the public sphere.

Women have no role in their society and their community. They do not have the right to talk about sensitive issues that concern the country, which are considered to be exclusively men’s concerns.

Community Meeting, Sabha

TABLE 9

#### The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men<sup>53</sup>

Q29.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	6%	11%	8%
2	4%	15%	10%
3	8%	16%	12%
4	21%	27%	24%
Strongly agree	59%	27%	43%
Prefer not to answer	2%	4%	3%

Similarly, a large majority (71 per cent) of men agreed that “political power should largely be in the hands of men” compared with 55 per cent of women (Q28).

The leadership is for men because they are the head of the family (the breadwinner)

Woman Activist in Ajdabiya

**TABLE 10:**

**The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men**

Q28.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	9%	14%	12%
2	10%	18%	14%
3	8%	11%	9%
4	26%	28%	27%
Strongly agree	45%	27%	36%
Prefer not to answer	1%	3%	2%

Inequalities increase in Libyan society because men are considered to be the strongest, most knowledgeable, and responsible for leading the world. This is emphasised in the educational curricula, which has deepened the gender gap and justified violence against women

Community Meeting, Tripoli

**Financial incentives and women’s economic vulnerability**

Poor economic conditions and the lack of paid work were considered by research participants to be one of the main factors leading both men and women to join violent extremist groups in all four research sites.<sup>54</sup> The gender dynamics are explained below, however, among all our participants, the clearest examples of financial incentives driving recruitment came from Sabha.<sup>55</sup> Paid work in militia and extremist groups was seen as a strong pull factor by many interviewed in field research. As one participant said: “Financial recruitment has a great impact. It attracts the job seekers and the poor, and allows recruiting on the street”.<sup>56</sup>

Financial motivations to join violent extremist groups work in complex ways in the context of the war

economy in Libya.<sup>57</sup> Poor people are very vulnerable to recruitment, however, participants in the community meeting in Sabha said that radical extremists take advantage of people’s ignorance, “so they can easily influence the illiterate class”. These participants also noted that extremist groups can also “reach educated individuals”,<sup>58</sup> and “individuals with money”.<sup>59</sup> Tribal elites, for instance, seek to control oil fields and illicit trade, propelling relatively wealthy individuals into joining extremist groups. Libya’s oil fields and illicit economies provide “greed” based incentives and the financial means to keep fighting. At the same time, the lack of economic opportunities make young people an easy target for armed groups and Al Qaeda-affiliated recruiters in Sabha.<sup>60</sup>

In Benghazi, participants in community meetings emphasised the impact of the deteriorating economic

“Financial recruitment has a great impact. It attracts the job seekers and the poor, and allows recruiting on the street”.

FGD Mixed Gender, Benghazi.

situation of families that pushed many sons to join ISIS and Al Qaeda affiliated groups offering economic incentives.<sup>61</sup>

This research supports previous research that found poverty, inequality, unemployment and lack of government or private sector service provision to be the major factors leading Libyans to join violent extremist groups.<sup>62</sup> Economic rebuilding in the context of ongoing militia violence and political stalemate has been slow. In a recent survey, 61 per cent of the women respondents were unemployed and 75 per cent of male

respondents were underemployed.<sup>63</sup> Under these economic conditions, the wages and opportunities for making money “pull” individuals towards armed groups. In addition, since 2011, youth unemployment and the prevalence of militia jobs with opportunities for wages and loot have been factors in young Libyans joining violent extremist groups. In Libya, ISIS paid monthly salaries.<sup>64</sup> Analysis of the survey found that many Libyans (82 per cent) had low or no incomes, with a majority of women (56 per cent) having no income, compared to a majority of men having an income of less than 1000 Libyan Dinar.<sup>65</sup>

**TABLE 11:**  
**What is your personal average monthly income (in Libyan Dinar)?**

Q6.	Male	Female	Total
No income	21%	56%	38%
less than 1000	50%	38%	44%
1000 - 5000	30%	6%	18%
5001 - 10000	0.4%	0%	0%

Several research participants said that violent extremist groups target poor and vulnerable women, in particular. As a woman politician in Benghazi said: violent extremist groups “seek to attract women who are vulnerable” and violent extremist groups “take advantage of her poverty”.<sup>66</sup> Changing gender roles brought about by the economic hardships of war have paradoxically helped violent extremist groups recruit women. As a participant in Tripoli said: “Financial temptations and marriage are some of the factors that violent groups use to attract women. Divorced and widowed women are more vulnerable”.<sup>67</sup>

Violent extremist groups target excluded and vulnerable women: spinsters, widows, divorcees. In a recent survey conducted by UN Women, in Libya within a statistically significant sample, 40 per cent of women respondents reported being heads of household.<sup>68</sup> Nearly half of all survey respondents (42 per cent) agreed that wages motivated women to join violent extremist groups, while 34 per cent of people disagreed.

Violent extremist groups “seek to attract women who are going through financial hardship and who need work, because now more families depend more on women”.

Woman Interviewee, Tripoli

  

The greatest local suffering is women carrying “the burden of the family and raising children without the husband’s help”.

Woman Interviewee Sabha

The break-up of families, roll back in state services, widowhood and the few employment opportunities for men have increased women’s unpaid workloads. A teacher in Benghazi drew attention to the fact that the women’s roles change in “cases of divorce, death, absence, and disease”.<sup>69</sup> A significant number of our interviewees were widows, especially in Sabha. One said, “after the death of my husband I take care of my family”,<sup>70</sup> and another explained, “I am the caregiver, as I am a widow with five children, now after the death of my husband, I’m the one making decisions”.<sup>71</sup> A few women said they take care of themselves, or their families.<sup>72</sup> “Women are everything; working outside and inside the house. I am the head of the family”.<sup>73</sup> The double burden is a significant weight, and adds substantially to women’s depletion. One woman described their greatest suffering as women carrying “the burden of the family and raising children without the husband’s help”.<sup>74</sup>

Demobilisation and reintegration of male soldiers has also been a familiar, if intractable problem in Libya, driving ongoing recruitment to militia and violent extremist groups. On the one hand, Libyan

scholars point to the “inability to meet or realistically address the demands of the revolutionaries/ freedom fighters of the Liberation war to be absorbed in state institutions or to be granted suitable jobs” has meant many soldiers continue to bear arms and join conflicts, linked to the notions of breadwinning, male leadership and Libyan masculinity described above.<sup>75</sup>

Half of all survey respondents in this study agreed or strongly agreed that men should sacrifice their wellbeing to support the women in their lives. This social expectation that men will work for wages to support a family increases the attraction of the financial incentives offered by violent extremist groups. Among survey respondents, 60 per cent of men and 55 per cent of women agreed that “men join a violent extremist group because that group offers them money” (Q41). Ascribing financial motivation to male violent extremists was stronger than for female violent extremists. A number of participants stated that men were targeted more often for recruitment to violent extremist groups. Legal professional participants in Benghazi “concluded that men are more attracted to violent extremism than women”.<sup>76</sup>

**TABLE 12:**  
**Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives**

Q31.	Percent
Strongly disagree	15%
2	21%
3	12%
4	24%
Strongly agree	26%
Prefer not to answer	1%

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- Raise awareness on the protection of women's rights to counter violent extremist messaging.
- Women's economic dependency makes it easy for violent extremist groups to blackmail women and girls to join or remain with violent extremist groups. Efforts to prevent violent extremism need to address women's financial dependence on men through employment and income-generating opportunities and training. Preventing and countering violent extremism programmes need to provide refuge and income support to women seeking to leave violent extremist male family members.
- Preventing and countering violent extremism programmes must target women vulnerable to violent extremism: widows, divorcees, victims of violence against women and girls.
- Consistent with commitments to the Women, Peace and Security, governments and external actors should support gender-sensitive, conflict-sensitive economic reconstruction that provides access to economic resources for women as well as men.

### 4.3

#### Finding 3:

#### Media Recruitment Messaging is Distinctively Tailored to Men & Women

A third aspect of gender dynamics of radicalization arising from empirical data is recruitment and media. Participants said that in Libya, media can both play a positive and a negative role in violent extremism: "Media can promote a discourse of peace and rejecting hate and violent speech but can also be a tool to spread violent extremist ideas".<sup>77</sup> Most participants had noticed extremist messaging, both online messaging "promoting exaggerated images of Islamic State",<sup>78</sup> and in traditional formats like radio and television. Participants pointed to the role of donors in traditional media like TV, which they saw as promoting "corruption" or "serving the agenda of decision makers and donors".<sup>79</sup> They saw "corrupt" media as contributing to the fragmentation of Libyan

society, because it has promoted divisions among communities by encouraging ideas that served external agendas.<sup>80</sup> Sabha participants complained that media had been suspended in their town.<sup>81</sup>

According to fieldwork, TV channels have contributed to the spread of violent extremism among women. TV is also the cheapest and most accessed media in Libya. Participants suggested that a number of women, "housewives", follow programs that broadcast extremist messaging. These TV channels and programs often feature preachers advocating for extremist ideas, and promoting fatwas intolerance, the subordination of women to men, and the idea of divine punishment. Preachers use their TV media presence as a platform to advance and spread radical ideas among Libyan women.<sup>82</sup> One participant drew attention to the role of populist media, saying that "non-intellectual media is stirring fundamentalism and division in Libyan society".<sup>83</sup> Traditional media is not trusted and has spread fundamentalist ideas to women.<sup>84</sup>

The Internet is not suitable for me because my husband forbids it.

Woman Interviewee, Ajdabiya

It was reported that family members could restrict women’s access to media. A woman in Ajdabiya said: “I get my information from people and television and I follow series and programs. I do not read. I do not have books, and the Internet is not suitable for me because my husband forbids it: I’m only browsing Google.”<sup>85</sup>

Social media was noted to be “fast but unreliable”, as well as a known site where ISIS is present, and used with reservation. However, many citizens interviewed in Ajdabiya and Tripoli, especially women, said that they did not use any internet; a number could not read. Internet penetration is around 60 per cent but power outages and infrastructure restrict the reach of internet media.<sup>86</sup>

The growth of internet media allows people to exist in a media ‘echo chamber’. One Salafi woman in Benghazi said she did not watch TV because it was “haram”, and indicated she often followed fundamentalist or extremist media: “I do not watch television because it is haram. Instead I follow the webpages of the righteous (*Salafi*), read reliable religious books, and books related to the fatwas. I follow only the scholars of the Salafi movement.”<sup>87</sup>

According to participants in field research in Benghazi, social media continues to play a prominent and influential role in attracting people by purveying hate speech:

They use the extremist, intimidating speeches, which misinterpret religion and the concepts of Heaven and Hell, and create synergistic groups online. They create the concept of a virtual cosmic family, which creates a sense of belonging to its members. These groups are investing heavily in spreading terrorism in the entire world and recruit more young people.<sup>88</sup>

The numbers are instructive as to the significant numbers of people seeing terrorist recruitment taking place online. A notable minority of men (13 per cent) and women (12 per cent) reported seeing recruitment to violent groups online. A significant number of both men (11 per cent) and women (18 per cent) preferred not to answer. Given the relatively low rates of internet use in Libya (60 per cent), this is an important finding showing that online recruitment is relatively frequent.<sup>89</sup>

**TABLE 13:**  
**How often have you seen violent extremist groups trying to recruit members through social media in social media?**

Q15.	Male	Female	Total
Never	41%	43%	42%
2	11%	11%	11%
3	16%	10%	12%
4	7%	6%	6%
Very often	13%	12%	12%
Prefer not to answer	11%	18%	15%

Further, eleven per cent of women respondents reported seeing violence against women and girls online “very often” compared to just three per cent of

men, while 7 per cent of men compared with 15 per cent of women stated that they have seen violence against women and girls “frequently” online.

**TABLE 14:**  
**How often have you seen material inciting violence towards women and girls posted in social media?**

Q14.	Male	Female	Total
Never	65%	62%	63%
2	12%	9%	11%
3	8%	6%	7%
4	4%	4%	4%
Very often	3%	11%	8%
Prefer not to answer	8%	8%	8%

22 per cent of men compared with 78 per cent of women stated that they have seen violence against women “frequently” online.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Libyan research participants frequently saw gendered recruitment messaging online. In qualitative research they pointed to the role of traditional media (radio and TV), in particular, promoting gender regressive ideologies and intolerance.

- Oversight of traditional media channels in Libya is imperative to limit gender stereotyping and intolerant messaging and to promote positive, more gender-equal norms and relationships.
- Gender-sensitive education that recognizes and seeks to combat harmful stereotypes about ideal men (as fighters, self-sacrificing breadwinners) and women (only valued for their reproductive, domestic and/or sexual services).
- Internet recruitment to violent extremism is relatively common. Men and women need to be able to recognize and be encouraged to safely report extremist activity online.

## 4.4

### Finding 4:

#### Kinship Relations and Violent Extremism

Taking a micro-level view, male supremacy, especially male leadership of the household, is supported by the majority of Libyans, with significant gender differences between men and women. A female teacher from Benghazi gives a typical response: “Men are obliged to do business and provide all of what the house needs. The roles are for women: housewife and taking care of the education of children. The man is the head of the family”.<sup>90</sup> Men were held to be the “authority”,<sup>91</sup> the “leaders of the house”,<sup>92</sup> and ought to provide economic security and protection.<sup>93</sup> Men’s paid work was used to justify their household leadership.<sup>94</sup>

Male leadership of the household has a basis in Libyan Marriage Law.<sup>95</sup> Each political group and various militia in Libya (Tripoli based militia, Islamist brigades, the Libyan National Army militia) purports its own particular version of masculinity.<sup>96</sup> Some scholars argue that some conservative political parties and violent extremist groups have tried to gain electoral success by embodying a form of patriarchal masculinity predicated on control over women.

Marriage remains a hot button issue on all sides. Because of the sensitivity of the topic, information was scant and prone to bias. Women are recruited (voluntarily and by force) to violent extremist groups through sex and marriage. For instance, a participant in Benghazi said a relative of theirs fled to Syria after becoming emotionally involved with an ISIS member that she met through social media.<sup>97</sup> However, research participants did mention “Jihad al Nikah” (Jihad of Marriage) as a motivator for women. One person in Ajdabiya claimed that a search for “pleasure” could be part of the Jihad al Nikah, which the participant connected

to single women’s vulnerability in poor economic conditions and the high levels of “spinsterhood”.<sup>98</sup> Islamists have politicized the marriages of Libyan women to non-Libyans and non-Sunni Muslims.<sup>99</sup> Discrimination against Sunni women’s marriages to Shia men, an issue that extremist groups mobilize around, was noted in a focus group in Ajdabiya.<sup>100</sup>

Forced marriage and child marriage are forms of violence against women, and findings here overlap with the following section on violence against women. Forced marriage of girl children to violent extremists were noted by research participants. Women and girls married to extremist men face financial problems and social stigma if they divorce. Girls and women were severely disempowered in such processes. A participant in a community meeting said that male guardians married off women without their consent, including to extremists. He said: “The marriage of women to the followers of extremist ideology by her guardian without her consent does take place. Then she has to stay with him because a divorced woman isn’t acceptable in society”.<sup>101</sup> Students in Tripoli explained how child marriage was justified by parents seeking to protect their daughters:

In Libya, the marriage of minors has proliferated because parents want to get rid of the burden of the responsibility toward their daughters. In addition, the situation of insecurity and instability in Libya makes parents worried that their daughters are kidnapped and assaulted. Therefore, they choose to marry them at a younger age, and for the girls to be the responsibility of their husbands.<sup>102</sup>

In the survey, most respondents (75 per cent) disagreed with a father’s right to force his girl-child to marry. Eleven per cent of men, however, agreed it was the father’s right, as did 10 per cent of women.

The marriage of women to the followers of extremist ideology by her guardian without her consent does take place. Then she has to stay with him because a divorced woman isn’t acceptable in society

Community Meeting, Ajdabiya

**TABLE 15:**

**A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old**

Q87.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	52%	65%	59%
2	19%	13%	16%
3	15%	9%	12%
4	7%	7%	7%
Strongly agree	4%	3%	4%
Prefer not to answer	3%	3%	3%

**Gender Power Relations in the Household**

The research found that Libyans acknowledged high and increasing levels of sexism throughout Libya. A woman in Sabha expressed it thus: “It is an unfair society which looks down on women. Men enjoy privileges and greater power”.<sup>103</sup> There was extensive recognition from research participants of Libya as a “patriarchal society”,<sup>104</sup> even among male interviewees.<sup>105</sup> Further, one interviewee linked patriarchy with generalised inequality saying, Libya “is not a fair society; even basic needs and rights are acquired through connections. Men have privileges and more power. Right now, there is no respect for women anymore”.<sup>106</sup> Participants in the community meeting in Tripoli suggested gender inequality was increasing, saying: “Inequalities increase in Libyan society because men are considered to be the strongest, most knowledgeable, and responsible for leading the world. This is emphasised in the educational curricula, which has deepened the gender gap and justified violence against women”.<sup>107</sup>

Many of the fieldwork research participants mentioned subordination to male kin as a driver of womens’ recruitment. For instance, according to a legal professional in Benghazi, “subordination to men and lack of independence are factors that can push women to join violent extremist groups”.<sup>108</sup> One

focus group in Benghazi said, that in their experience, recruitment can be driven by “subordination to the husband; to be in his service and at his mercy. This is especially true for young women or young girls”.<sup>109</sup> One of the focus groups which comprised civil servants and legal professionals in Benghazi discussed how the “legal violence” [of the personal status law] pushes women to join violent extremist groups. In other words, join because they are “subordinate to men”.<sup>110</sup>

A women-only focus group discussion in Ajdabiya explained that recruitment of women could often be easier than recruitment of men: “Yes, although often the focus is on men, but female recruitment is easier, and women can be recruited through the husband or the brother, by virtue of subordination”.<sup>111</sup> The mixed focus group in Ajdabiya agreed that women’s subordination was key: “Islamic State attracts men first, then the sisters, wives and daughters by virtue of the subordination of women to men in society”.<sup>112</sup> Women subordinate to and/or dependent on male relatives in violent extremist groups are likely to be radicalized and/or recruited by those men. Male leadership of the household is a gender specific driver of violent extremism because of the multiple ways in which women are persuaded and coerced by their husbands, brothers, or sons to joining violent extremist groups.

Islamic State attracts men first, then the sisters, wives and daughters by virtue of the subordination of women to men in society.<sup>113</sup>

FGD Mixed Gender, Ajdabiya

Relatedly, serious family law injustices remain legal. For instance, sexual violence is still treated as a crime against a woman’s honour rather than against her human rights, and rapists can escape jail sentences by marrying a victim.<sup>114</sup> The generalized lawlessness and legal pluralism mean that women and girls can be detained for “moral crimes” such as engaging in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage.<sup>115</sup> Inheritance and divorce remain hot-button issues in Libya. Under current provisions, women cannot obtain a no-fault divorce, or they risk forfeiting their bride price and the custody of their children (a *khula* divorce). Divorced women face thus stigma and severe financial problems.<sup>116</sup>

Comparing legal expert opinion on personal status laws with those in the survey is insightful. A large majority of men (78 per cent) and a majority of women (68 per cent) support the idea that women need a male guardian to protect the honour of the family. Eighty-two per cent of men think that women need a male guardian for women’s safety and protection compared to 74 per cent of women. The limited gender gap in these answers may indicate a degree of realism among some women in the context of very strong societal support for these patriarchal institutions.

The mothers are proud of their membership of the Salafi movement led by their sons, and they are proud of the financial gains and moral standing they receive in exchange for support.

Community Meeting, Ajdabiya

**TABLE 16:**  
**Women need a male guardian to protect the honour of their family**

Q34.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	5%	11%	8%
2	9%	11%	10%
3	7%	7%	7%
4	22%	23%	23%
Strongly agree	56%	45%	51%
Prefer not to answer	1%	2%	2%

Importantly, women are not only recruited through husbands, by virtue of wifely subordination, but they are recruited through their sons by virtue of ‘sacrificial motherhood’. More precisely, the definition of motherhood in Libya as “sacrifice” means that mothers ought to sacrifice everything for their sons. Participants in the Ajdabiya community meeting, described how women are recruited not just through their husbands, but also through their sons.<sup>117</sup> In Ajdabiya, a mother joined ISIS not because she embraced extremist ideas but because her only son joined.<sup>118</sup> In Benghazi focus group discussions, participants talked about two profiles of mothers who join violent extremist groups. Some join to revenge the death of a family member (for example, their son)<sup>119</sup> and other mothers join to take

advantage of financial and economic privileges to improve their economic situation. According to participants in a focus group in Ajdabiya: “The mothers are proud of their membership of the Salafi movement led by their sons, and they are proud of the financial gains and moral standing they receive in exchange for support”.<sup>120</sup>

Sons could act as the male head of the family, controlling family allegiances, as well as their mother’s “behavior and dress”.<sup>121</sup> At the community meeting in Sabha, participants agreed “in the South of Libya, young men in the family have control over the family and decisions that impact women”,<sup>122</sup> and sons do not bow to their mother’s control after the age of fifteen.<sup>123</sup>

## Impact of Extremism on Families

To begin, violent extremism is contentious. Although participants overwhelmingly described extremism and violent extremism as negative (“chaotic” “destructive” and distorting of religion”) definitions and opinions did vary. In Sabha, three respondents thought that extremism or intolerance could be a force for good. A minority of participants thought extremism may have a positive effect on family unity. For instance, one middle aged woman said that: “The impact [of extremism] is positive if the individual doesn’t become radical”. That is, participants saw that commitment to (conservative) religious family values that extremists promote as positive in times of chaos. Another woman in Sabha said “extremism threatens stability and social cohesion,” in broader society but in the same breath said “intolerance is positive if it leads to the unification of the family”. Likewise, an older woman in Sabha drawing on her experiences, said that “the consequences of radicalization are corruption and destruction; [but] it has a positive impact on families because they become close to God”. A 34-year-old woman agreed that extremism had positive effects on family unity, and negative overall impacts.

Parents would be very unlikely to counter or prevent extremism in their sons “if their children are the ones providing the money.

Male Politician, Ajdabiya

Gendered household dynamics played a role in recruitment. A lack of cohesive families—sometimes phrased as a lack of motherly care—was seen as a factor in radicalisation. More interviewees felt that family fragmentation and displacement caused by the conflict (out of parents’ control) made preventing extremism by parents very difficult. According to Benghazi community meeting attendees, “the role of parents is weak and most of young recruits are influenced by their peers, media, and mosques. It is very hard for parents to influence their children once radicalised and involved in a violent extremist group”.<sup>124</sup> One participant said that parents would be very unlikely to counter or prevent extremism in their sons “if their children are the ones providing the money”.<sup>125</sup> A son’s coercion of his mother could be violent;

sons would “kill them too, if they refuse to follow and obey them”.<sup>126</sup> Some mothers sacrifice to be with their extremist sons, some are coerced into joining, and some are proud of the financial gains and moral status they accrue. An occasional participant judged mothers incompetent, and blamed mothers for supporting violent extremist groups by “not raising their children properly”.<sup>127</sup>

Similarly, fathers were perceived to have diminished in stature and power due to a loss of breadwinner status: “The role of the father lacked strength due to the economic conditions in the city of Sabha, which affected his relationship with his children”.<sup>128</sup> As one interviewee in Ajdabiya put it, declining money meant declining power: “If the child is young or a teen, a father can influence him, but if the child is older the father cannot influence him, because the role of the father is declining because of the economic changes in our society”.<sup>129</sup>

Any organization that tries to attract people is always targeting people who have difficulty in their family relations, where the person feels hatred and experiences violence.

FGD Mixed Gender, Ajdabiya

For many, family structures had changed since the revolution: “Parents lost their identity and role in the family”.<sup>130</sup> One focus group participant emphasised how extremist groups used the dislocation and lack of family protection, and violence in the family to recruit young people. She said:

Any organization that tries to attract people is always targeting people who have difficulty in their family relations, where the person feels hatred and experiences violence. Here, the individual finds no place to express pain, suffering, and hatred, and in the absence of the family, women are not protected and are marginalised. As a last resort, they seek out a place that will provide them with everything they need.<sup>131</sup>

The personal impacts of extremism were apparent, but not readily discussed. A 46-year-old woman in Tripoli told researchers that violent extremism had led to:

...the death of my husband because he was a member of these organisations. [It also led] to my imprisonment and orphaned my son. Its consequences on society are catastrophic, and intolerance has a negative impact on the family because it dismantles and destroys it.<sup>132</sup>

Other participants also felt the impact of violent extremism on the family were severe. A young man in Tripoli described how “The consequences [of violent extremism] are catastrophic, because it causes fragmentation of the family”.<sup>133</sup> An older woman in Sabha felt there had been a “negative impact of religious intolerance on families”.<sup>134</sup> The community meeting in Sabha drew attention to the fact that the collapse in the standard of living due to economic conditions has negatively affected the unity and cohesion of the Libyan family.<sup>135</sup>

## Women’s Roles in Extremist Groups

A number of interlocutors pointed to the fact that “violent extremist groups prefer [to recruit] men more than women”.<sup>136</sup> Men are crucial to the functioning of violent extremism in Libya. Some reports suggest around 250,000 to 350,000 Libyan men have joined radical groups but data is very limited, with no indication of the age or sex segregation of these groups. It is recognized that a significant number of female fighters, Libyan and foreign, were part of ISIS in Libya. Female foreign fighters included women from Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, and Niger. According to news reports, female members of ISIS in Libya had a range of roles. Other available news sources allege that women have also been involved in “teaching”, inciting people to violence, and providing intelligence in Libya.<sup>137</sup>

Sexual and reproductive roles were perceived as important to this process of gender role enforcement. For instance, a woman in Ajdabiya described how, in her opinion, “violent extremist groups treat women as a commodity and consider women a tool for pleasure that can be used by men”.<sup>138</sup> One participant said she believed “extremist groups recruited young women and exploited their role in society [as wives and mothers] to facilitate the implementation of terrorist operations, as happened in Sirte”.<sup>139</sup>

It seems that women have taken on diverse roles in violent extremist groups, as stated above. However, as a rule, research participants described how they perceived that traditional gender roles are reproduced and amplified in extremist groups. One participant noted that the focus on male members of violent extremist groups was an oversimplification.<sup>140</sup>

Although participants mostly reported on their perceptions of women’s subordinate or sexualised roles in violent extremist groups, occasionally participants noted women’s leadership roles. There is a perception that women recruited to extremist groups tend to be more empowered.<sup>141</sup> One woman active in the courts in Benghazi said that violent extremist groups “like to recruit women leaders who have positions in society and who have more influence”, but no concrete examples were given.<sup>142</sup> Another expert in a focus group suggested that women’s extremism is “more dangerous” than that of men’s “because they have good communication skills, are easily integrated into groups and people trust women”.<sup>143</sup> Triangulating this with other work, a trend emerges wherein violent extremist groups offer a narrative of women’s empowerment, and propaganda promoting women leaders and fighters. Realities of gender relations in such groups are far from empowering.<sup>144</sup>

Violent extremist groups treat women as a commodity and consider women a tool for pleasure that can be used by men.

Woman Interviewee, Ajdabiya

## Changing Gender Roles

The majority of research participants across all sites agreed that the traditional gender roles of men supporting the family through paid work and women working solely in the home were changing.<sup>145</sup> Women had more power, according to a female legal professional in Benghazi, because of increasing economic empowerment: “Sometimes a woman’s influence on a man is greater because the role of women economically in the family has increased, therefore they have a say in strategic decisions in the family”.<sup>146</sup>

The disconnect between the ideal traditional gender division of labour with a male breadwinner and housewife, and the reality of women’s paid and unpaid work was evident in the qualitative research. A housewife in Ajdabiya complained that traditional roles dominated “despite the fact that women are

more efficient and they have the ability to make money and combine both being a housewife and a worker”.<sup>147</sup> The gap between reality and practice was expressed by a male university lecturer who said that use of household income was still in men’s hands, because “in the case of a working wife, the man uses her money to pay the bills”.<sup>148</sup> Moreover, women’s domestic work was prioritized: “Women have an important role as housewives, even if they are educated”.<sup>149</sup>

Even more gender regressive views than these were evident in the research. Ajdabiya was described as a very conservative city, with no women not wearing the niqab “because of tribal controls” and “no women going out to malls or markets”.<sup>150</sup> Although interviewees in Benghazi were legal professionals, and therefore expected to be liberal, some expressed very conservative views of women’s roles.<sup>151</sup>

Ajdabiya was described as a very conservative city, with no women without the niqab “because of tribal controls” and “no women going out to malls or markets”.

Female Public Servant, Ajdabiya

### RECOMMENDATIONS

Legal and cultural subordination of women through marriage is a driver of women’s recruitment to violent extremism. Yet, gender equality legal reforms face significant challenges in a conflict-affected, fragile state.

- Governments need to be mindful that concessions to extremist groups that disempower women through marriage laws and other legal gender discrimination may legitimize extremist ideologies and facilitate recruitment to violent extremism of both disempowered women and men seeking dominance.
- Civil society groups need to sensitise decision-makers about the connections between marriage and violent extremist recruitment of women and their families. This knowledge and advocacy could persuade parliamentarians to end discrimination in family and personal status laws.
- Education and civil society campaigns about legal reform to promote women’s equality and human rights should be prioritised because reform is contentious and needs to be promoted on local terms. For instance, advocacy for personal status law reform must be discussed and debated in civil society to prevent further backlash given the broad support male guardianship currently enjoys.
- Regional cooperation on form of personal status laws should put women’s rights at the centre. International organisations can play a role by supporting women’s rights defenders and the capacity of their organisations in the face of gender regressive backlash.

## 4.5

### Finding 5:

#### Some Religious Institutions Spread Intolerance & Sexism

This section explains the role of some religious institutions, especially schools, spreading intolerance, extremism and discriminatory gender ideology. Importantly however, there was no relationship between religiosity and support for violent extremism in our survey analysis (Q9). Likewise, there was no relationship between religiosity and support for violent extremism among men and women, or young people and adults. A significant number of respondents considered themselves moderately religious, with more reporting themselves to be irreligious people than extremely religious.

According to participants, some religious schools (madrassa) play a role in spreading radical ideas promoting the adoption of extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or oppose the status quo and contemporary ideas and including human rights, especially women's human rights, freedom of expression, democracy and so on. This is especially true "in the absence of the State", as one participant put it.<sup>152</sup> There is no law regulating

religious schools. Frequently, such schools start out as "normal" schools, and then management starts to become religious.<sup>153</sup> The doctrinal affiliations of the madrassa vary, and control of religious schools and mosques is hotly contested in Libya.<sup>154</sup> A number of participants complained that religious schools were not subject to state oversight.<sup>155</sup>

There has been an increase in the number of religious schools spreading radicalism and the lack of state school infrastructure and supervision creates a service provision gap for extremists to fill. Research participants noted an increase in the number of madrassa in Libya spreading "fanatical discourse"<sup>156</sup> and that young people were radicalised in religious schools.<sup>157</sup> In Benghazi, a recently established koranic school started with one school campus, and now they have four branches, with strict separation between male and female pupils.<sup>158</sup> Participants in a community meeting in Ajdabiya, for instance, thought such education increased the likelihood of radicalisation: "Women are sometimes convinced by extremist ideas, especially those who went through the process of training in women-only koranic study groups or madrassa and specialised religious institutions".<sup>159</sup>

**TABLE 17:**  
**Religiosity in Libya**

Q9.	Percent	Frequency
Not at all religious	18%	182
2	20%	206
3	41%	412
4	15%	151
Extremely religious	6%	56

There is a spread of religious schools in the South of Libya because the government has neglected the South, which resulted in weak policies and the dominance of religious schools, biased perspectives on women.

Community Meeting 4 Sabha

The South was badly affected: “There is a spread of religious schools in the South of Libya because the government has neglected the South, which resulted in weak policies and the dominance of religious schools biased perspectives on women”;<sup>160</sup> and in the South there are many religious schools not under government control”.<sup>161</sup> One focus group in Tripoli feared the unsupervised growth of “hard-line religious schools” would “produce a generation that deny women their rights”.<sup>162</sup> Schools were described as having a big influence, “especially on those women and youth neglected by the state”.<sup>163</sup> In other words, vulnerable people like widows, single parents and orphans, without access to services and infrastructure.

Schools were described as having a big influence especially on women and youth neglected by the State.

Community Meeting, Sabha

Certain madrasa reinforced women’s subordination to male relatives, and reinforced women’s confinement to sexual and reproductive spheres. Religious schools in Libya often impose a dress code for girls, but this varies. The kind of teaching will also vary from one school to the other. Some would teach radical texts and others would teach more moderate texts. According to participants, this practice has spread in Tripoli, Sabha, and Ajdabiya more than in Benghazi.<sup>164</sup>

Significantly, the curriculum in religious schools, as well as normal schools, enforces gender roles that classify women as nurturers, confining them to reproductive roles.<sup>165</sup> Religious schools promote strict dress, gender

segregation of pupils and content, and traditional gender roles. One participant drew attention to the strange ways gender norms could be reinforced in schools and families, for example, “the penalty of the son that he will sit next to a girl in the event of any undesirable work, resulting in gender segregation and psychological [reinforcement]”.<sup>166</sup> An educational professional in Benghazi complained that ignorance about sex and members of the opposite sex led young people to seek answers and romance in violent extremist groups. She said:

The religious curriculum does not explain matters related to marriage and sex, and mixing between men and women. In Islamic education, a teacher’s role in explaining issues related to sex, virginity and families is weak as a result of shyness (sex is a taboo topic). Because they do not explain these things to the children, the children become attracted to violent extremist groups.<sup>167</sup>

Gender-segregation in classes is an increasing trend and imposed in religious schools and universities as a way of distinguishing themselves and enforcing what they see as religious law.<sup>168</sup> In the survey, more women (39 per cent) than men (29 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that groups protesting in favour of gender segregation at universities was a sign of rising extremism. Gender segregation in universities was seen as a warning sign of violent extremism by more women than men (Q62). A significant number of survey respondents (33 per cent of women, compared with 27 per cent of men) agreed that women dressing more conservatively was a sign of a family becoming extremist. This survey finding validates the idea that control over women’s dress is a gendered sign of extremism, similar to findings elsewhere (Q61).<sup>169</sup>

**TABLE 18:**

**One student, Hassan, told us: “One sign of extremism is when groups start protesting to segregate university classes into men and women or boys and girls. They always want men and women to be separate”. How much do you agree with Hassan’s statement?**

Q62.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	23%	20%	21%
2	18%	12%	15%
3	22%	21%	22%
4	10%	11%	11%
Strongly agree	19%	28%	23%
Prefer not to answer	8%	7%	8%

According to the participants in community meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi, many parents in Libya choose to send their kids to religious schools because they believe that religious schools will guide them to the “right path”.<sup>170</sup> These schools were “popular” with families<sup>171</sup> and parents “don’t check the curricula”.<sup>172</sup> One participant in Benghazi described the misplaced trust parents had in schools and koranic study groups:

The young people here are completely isolated from their families and spend a lot of time in koranic study groups. Families believe that their child is learning the true value of religion and reciting the Koran, while most of these gatherings are dominant by extremist ideas. In this context, educational curricula inculcate discrimination and extremism in the name of traditional gender roles or religion in the minds of children and young people.<sup>173</sup>

Most participants said that women’s role in the religious sphere was limited to these “closed” gatherings in which women guide other women and help women memorise the Koran, usually held at a member’s house or at a mosque.<sup>176</sup> Women then transmit religious instruction of their children.<sup>177</sup> Such groups were very common in Ajdabiya: “the number of these women-only Koranic study groups is far greater than schools, and many girls drop out of school and they stay in these study groups”.<sup>178</sup> There is little supervision of content in such groups. One female group member said the groups have changed. At women-only Koranic study groups they used to learn “everything” but now it has become limited to memorising the Koran.<sup>179</sup>

Leaders of women-only koranic study groups [...] exclude all those who embrace moderate thought.

FGD Mixed Gender, Ajdabiya

## Women-only Koranic Study Groups

Women-only koranic study groups were emphasised as the main site of recruitment for women across the four research sites in Libya. According to all our interviewers, focus group and community meeting participants, women-only koranic study groups played a major role in the spread of violent extremism.<sup>174</sup> According to a number of participants, women trained in women-only koranic study groups; religious schools and specialized religious institutions were easily turned towards extremism.<sup>175</sup> Women-only koranic study groups played a major role in the spread of violent extremism.

Many young women spend a lot of time in women-only Koranic study groups and families believe that their daughter is learning the true values of religion through Koranic recitation, while in reality, since 2011 many of these gatherings are dominated by extremist ideas promoting violence and constricting women’s rights.<sup>180</sup> Many families do not know who leads these gatherings and what ideas are discussed during these meetings.<sup>181</sup> Since 2011, many of the women only koranic study groups are dominated by extremist ideas. A former member of a woman-only Koranic study group in Ajdabiya said the groups were far from moderate:

Leaders of women-only koranic study groups [...] exclude all those who embrace moderate thought. In the beginning, I was helping women memorise the Koran, I was promoting moderate Maliki thinking and ideas. They accused me of being part of the Muslim Brotherhood first, and then I was accused being a Secularist.<sup>182</sup>

Women-only koranic study group should be a tool for enlightening minds, not promoting violence and radical thinking, many stopped going to them because of the radical ideas and violence they promoted.

Female Teacher, Benghazi

The former study group member then said she was kicked out and then rejected by group members.<sup>183</sup> Another former group member, this time from Benghazi, described the increasing violent extremism propagated by such groups. She noted that the groups were fairly innocuous, prior to the revolution:

The women-only koranic study groups before the revolution were limited to memorizing the Koran, and basics such as praying, fasting, and performing Islamic charity. However, after the revolution, we noticed that many people are speaking in these gatherings about killing those who disagree with their opinion. Women-only koranic study group should be a tool for enlightening minds, not promoting violence and radical thinking, many stopped going to them because of the radical ideas and violence they promoted.<sup>184</sup>

Gender-regressive ideologies were a key reason of why she left the group.

The focus of research was not on men's or women's prayer groups specifically. However, their significance became evident in the field research. However, survey analysis revealed that a significant number of respondents (37 per cent) perceive men separating themselves from mainstream mosques as a warning sign of extremism, while many responses were neutral or preferred not to answer (31 per cent) (Q65).

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Girls and boys should be supported to access quality, formal education. If not free education, then with government subsidies.
- Government oversight of koranic schools and their curricula to ensure religious tolerance and human rights is necessary.
- A gender equality curricula review needs to be undertaken across primary, secondary and tertiary education with the aim of removing gender discriminatory aspects of the curriculum and teaching practices.
- Increasing respect for women and girls in educational institutions is imperative, and, at the same time, developing interventions to reduce bullying and sexual harassment in schools and universities.

## 4.6

### Finding 6:

#### Women Seek to Counter and Prevent Violent Extremism by Advocating for Women’s Rights, Which is Dangerous

The research confirms extant findings that Libyan women face severe restrictions in the public sphere as a result of their gender. This manifests as both a low level of freedom of movement, everyday violence, and policing of women in public space, and in violence against women’s rights activists and politicians. The Libya Status of Women Survey 2013 reported that “Libyan women were restricted in their abilities to move and express themselves freely, with a majority of women (57 per cent) being somewhat (20 per cent) or very (37 per cent) restricted in leaving their house without permission”.<sup>185</sup>

Nearly all participants in Sabha, Benghazi, and Tripoli agreed there was violence against women leaders. One participant in Sabha noted that extremist groups use violence “against women leaders and

their families because they play a role in raising awareness in the society”,<sup>186</sup> while another said it was because “women leaders confront violent extremist groups”.<sup>187</sup> Participants in Ajdabiya did not mention violence against women leaders. Interviewees in Sabha phrased it: “There is certainly violence against women leaders because violent extremist groups reject enlightened women”,<sup>188</sup> and “women leaders are considered their enemies”.<sup>189</sup> Another Sabha participant said that she knew in Benghazi that women leaders were “killed and threatened”.<sup>190</sup> A woman in Tripoli described how she had noted “the use of violence by extortion, kidnapping and other immoral means against women leaders and their families”.<sup>191</sup>

In the survey, 40 per cent of women respondents agreed that attacks on women leaders were signs of impending militia attacks compared to 33 per cent of men. Twenty-seven per cent of women strongly agreed with this statement: “I can tell when there will be extremist violence because militia start to attack women leaders” compared to 19 per cent of men, as shown in Table 19.

Extremist groups use violence “against women leaders and their families because they play a role in raising awareness in the society.

Female Interviewee, Sabha

**TABLE 19:**

**Another woman, Asma, linked violence to women politicians as a warning sign. She said, “I can tell when there will be extremist violence because militia start to attack women leaders”. How much do you agree with Asma’s statement?**

Q63.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	14%	14%	14%
2	18%	11%	15%
3	25%	20%	22%
4	14%	13%	13%
Strongly agree	19%	27%	23%
Prefer not to answer	10%	14%	12%

In the survey, there were few gender differences in responses on the statement that women's rights activists are seeking to have more power over men with 47 per cent of women and 44 per cent of men disagreeing with this statement. Still, a substantial proportion of respondents (37 per cent) agreed with the statement indicating that women's rights activism is contentious in Libya (Q23).

These findings help to make sense of the large number of women leaders have been killed in Libya since the revolution, many (allegedly) by violent extremist groups. More recently, Siham Sergiwa, a female Libyan member of parliament was abducted from her house by armed gunmen on 17 July 2019.<sup>192</sup> In addition to outright violence, violent extremist groups use extortion, blackmail, and smear campaigns to obstruct women leaders. Violent extremist groups target women leaders in social media campaigns with the intent of destroying their reputation, as well as threatening women through their social media accounts.<sup>193</sup> One interviewee in Benghazi described how violent extremist groups engage in gender-based image abuse by publishing defamatory photos of women leaders in order to silence them. She described how this has led many women to stop their political and activist work.<sup>194</sup>

## Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

But I do not think radicalism is acceptable in our society, because women and men roles are equal today, they have same responsibilities so difficult for extremist thought to change our society.

Male Education Expert, Benghazi.

As mentioned above, extremist groups are concerned about rising gender equality. Despite the threat of extremism to women's increasing status, a number of participants pointed to the resilience of ideals of gender equality in Libya. One man thought that "some violent extremist groups are worried about changing gender roles. But I do not think radicalism is acceptable in our society, because women's and men's roles are equal today, they have same responsibilities, so it is difficult for extremist thought to change our society".<sup>195</sup>

Sometimes the status of women and the unequal level of legislation regarding married couples motivates women to fight extremism.

Female Teacher, Tripoli

Injustice towards women motivates me to fight extremism.

Woman Interviewee, Tripoli

There is a slightly contradictory tendency, mentioned above, that inequality mobilises (especially men) to join violent extremist groups, while it mobilises (especially women) to fight violent extremism. Many interviewees, but not all, thought that gender inequality ("unequal status" "unequal legislation") rouses women to fight extremism.<sup>196</sup> Similarly, a woman in Tripoli told researchers that "the unequal status of women compared to husbands motivates them to fight extremism".<sup>197</sup> Another woman from Tripoli added that it motivates her personally: "Injustice towards women motivates me to fight extremism".<sup>198</sup> Education about the seriousness of extremism was seen by one participant to be an important aspect of prevention: "Ignorance is a driver to join violent extremist because if the woman knows the gravity of extremism then she will not join".<sup>199</sup>

The fight for gender equality in terms of legal rights was seen to motivate women to stand up to extremist groups. As a female teacher suggested:

"Women in my society do not live in a just society because men have a stronger role than women. They certainly enjoy greater privileges and power. Sometimes the status of women and the unequal level of legislation regarding married couples motivates women to fight extremism".<sup>200</sup>

In the survey, two thirds of female respondents and almost half of all male respondents were afraid that fundamentalism would impede women's rights. Smaller numbers of men (27 per cent) and women (16 per cent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.

**TABLE 20:**

**I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights (e.g. rights to work, travel alone, voice their opinion in public)**

Q70.	Male	Female	Total
Strongly disagree	14%	8%	11%
2	13%	8%	11%
3	18%	13%	15%
4	24%	31%	28%
Strongly agree	25%	35%	30%
Prefer not to answer	6%	6%	6%

Women play informal roles in countering and preventing violent extremism in Libya, although these roles are hardly documented. One participant noted that, “in Libya, we focus more on women’s marginalization and suffering than on the role of women in violent extremism and preventing it because of the conflict in Libya. It is important to emphasize the role of women in preventing and countering extremism and contributing to social cohesion”.<sup>201</sup> Interviewees in Benghazi emphasized the growing influence of women in the legal sphere and the rising importance of women lawyers. Women lawyers were particularly important in women’s divorce and family law issues, which overlap with extremist ideology and practice, as shown above. According to key interviewees and participants in the validation workshop, women’s political empowerment has also been a factor in countering violent extremism and furthering peace. The National Movement for Libya’s “tent movement” is a significant example of such activism: women set up tents close to active battlefields and engage with other women who also suffered losses, thus creating a common experience of the conflict and promoting dialogue across tribal lines.<sup>202</sup>

Finally, motherhood is seen as crucial to the prevention of violent extremism in Libya, at the same time that motherhood is valorized and stereotyped. For instance, there are some news reports of mothers in Libya convincing foreign fighters to return home.<sup>203</sup> According to Bondoki, in the most conflict-affected areas older women are the only group trusted by all society members.<sup>204</sup> One participant said that mothers are observant and “[a] mother is the first person to notice extremism in the family. Because mothers are

closer to the children”.<sup>205</sup> A young male interviewee in Ajdabiya thought that educating mothers was key: “A conscious and educated mother knows what is happening in her family and can notice changes in her children and family members”.<sup>206</sup>

**Gender, Counter Terrorism and Countering & Preventing Violent Extremism**

There are not even places to detain women involved in (extremist) violence.

Woman Interviewee, Ajdabiya

There are few gender mainstreaming measures in counter terrorism, or countering and preventing violent extremism policies in Libya. As a female legal professional in Ajdabiya put it, there are very few measures to address the issue of women extremists: “There are not even places to detain women involved in violence. They are sent to Benghazi, and then returned to their families, which prevents them from going out and mixing with anyone”.<sup>207</sup>

After the recapture of Sirte from ISIS in 2016, 120 women were reported to be held in a Misrata prison on suspicion of jihadist links, even though many were likely victims of sexual slavery. According to Mannoichi, the General National Congress did not allow former enslaved women victims of rape to have abortions. The problems with lack of appropriate detention facilities was also raised by a number of gender and legal experts in the research validation process.<sup>208</sup>

Socio-economic rebuilding is deemed crucial to countering and preventing violent extremism but little progress has been made in this area. In 2012, ex-revolutionaries began the Libyan Program for Reintegration and Development. It has a number of different projects, but none targeted at women, although a majority of the 200 social advisors for the Libyan Program for Reintegration and Development reintegration program were women.<sup>209</sup> One key way that the Libyan Program for Reintegration and Development sought to revitalise the economy and reduce unemployment is through small and medium enterprises and microfinance, with a large project financed by the Islamic Development Bank. Other microfinance providers are also setting up in Libya. The gender disaggregation of clients is not known.<sup>210</sup>

One gender-specific way that the reintegration program LPRD aimed to reintegrate violent extremists and promote “social stability” was to help them pay for marriage costs. The Mawada Project is a collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs, comprising a social

program to help pay for single ex-combatants over 40 years old to get married and start a family. Through the Ministry’s fund, ex-fighters will receive financial aid for wedding arrangements and necessities. LPRD was reported as having approved payments to 4500 men in 2016. The LPRD remained unfunded after the beginning of the Second Libyan War. There are no further reports on the nature of the marriages, which were to be supported by the LPRD, or on their (gender-differentiated) impacts. There appear to be no specific payments or programs to integrate women extremist fighters or recruits. The problems with lack of appropriate detention facilities was also brought up by a number of gender and legal experts in the research validation process.<sup>211</sup>

The survey found that 40 per cent of respondents disagreed that needing money to pay brideprice was a factor in young men’s recruitment. However, a significant number (36 per cent) agreed that brideprice was a factor in young men’s recruitment, making this a contentious issue across our sample.

**TABLE 21:**  
**Young men join extremist groups to pay dowry (money or good or animals to the groom’s family) or bride-price (money or good or animals to the bride’s family).**

Q45.	Percent
Strongly disagree	23%
2	17%
3	17%
4	24%
Strongly agree	12%
Prefer not to answer	6%

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Gender responsive security sector reform is needed, including the provision of gender-sensitive protection for women politicians and women’s human rights defenders.
- Risk assessment models for violent extremism should take into account the perpetration of gender-based violence as an early warning indicator of violent extremism.
- International actors seeking to empower women leaders in peace and security processes in Libya need to ensure adequate, gender-sensitive protection for those women. All actors engaged in promoting the peaceful resolution of conflict in Libya need to be trained in conflict and gender-sensitive approaches.
- Local initiatives led by women on Penting violent extremism need to be documented and presented as good practices to be upscaled.

## 9.0

# ENDNOTES

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- 21 FGDo05-F - Ajdabiya

22	KI1048-F Sabha, 45 years old	50	KI1053-F Sabha, 60 years old
23	KI1062-F Sabha, 50 years old	51	KI1049-F Sabha, 40 years old
24	KI1048-F Sabha, 45 years old	52	KI1062-F Sabha, 50 years old
25	“Any Support” was deemed by an answer of “agree” or “strongly agree” to any of the following questions 64, 69, 70, 71, 72 and 79.	53	For all figures reporting differences in views between men and women we can reject the null hypothesis. We concluded that there is statistically significant evidence that perceptions are different depending on gender. The calculated value of the Chi-Square tests are reported in the Appendices. See Appendix Calculated Value of the Chi-Square Test: Scales and Questions.
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27	For example, KI1031-F_Tripoli, KI1032-F_Tripoli, KI1033-F_Tripoli, KI1034-F_Tripoli	55	KI1049-F Sabha, 40 years old; Community Meeting, Sabha, 15 December 2018
28	KI1027-F_Tripoli, 45 years old	56	FGD003-Mixed Gender, Benghazi 19 December 2018; But as Carboni and Moody argue, military control over border areas are not the actions of purely criminal gangs or tribes; rather, border control is negotiated in conjunction with the Tripoli and Benghazi governments, which are in turn responding to nation building and regional imperatives. Carboni and Moody, “Between the Cracks”.
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32	Mattes, “Libya since 2011:.”	60	Community Meeting, Sabha, 15 December 2018. Roberto Aliboni, <i>A Hard Diplomatic Transition in Libya: What Response from the EU and the 5+5 Dialogue?</i> (Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2017)
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34	KI1011-F_Benghazi, Legal Professional	62	Lydia Sizer, <i>Libya’s Terrorism Challenge</i>
35	KI1001-F_Benghazi, Politician	63	UN Women, <i>The Economic Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women</i>
36	KI1007-F_Benghazi	64	Human Rights Watch, <i>We Feel We Are Cursed, Life under Isis in Sirte, Libya.</i>
37	KI1050-F Sabha, 50 years old	65	Nearly a third of Libyans live at or below the poverty line. CIA <i>World Factbook: Libya, 2018</i> <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html</a> accessed 26.08.2019
38	Langhi, “Gender and State-Building in Libya”	66	KI1040-F_Tripoli, 35 years old
39	Alison Pargeter, “Libya,” in <i>Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance</i> , ed. Sanja Kelly and Julia Breslin (New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2010).	67	KI1031-F_Tripoli, 23 years old
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42	Jamie Dettmer, “Libyan Religious Leader Calls for Gender Segregation,” <i>ReliefWeb</i> , 29 April, 2013	70	KI1048-F Sabha, 45 years old
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48	FGD005-Mixed Gender, Ajdabiya, 24 November 2018		
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78	FGDoo5-F_Ajdabiya	101 Community Meeting 2 Ajdabiya,
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80	Community Meeting 2 Ajdabiya	103 KIlo62-F Sabha, 50 years old
81	Community Meeting 4 Sabha - 16 December 2018.	104 Community meeting Ajdabiya, KIlo30-F_Tripoli, 26 years old, KIlo28-F_Tripoli, 55 years old, KIlo29-F_Tripoli 42 years old
82	KIlo01-F_Benghazi	105 KIlo03-M_Benghazi, Businessman
83	FGDoo7-Mixed Gender - Tripoli - Students - 27 October 2018	106 KIlo63-F Sabha, 52 years old
84	Community Meeting 4 Sabha - 16 December 2018. Indeed, media in Libya is rated "not free" by Freedom House, because of lack of clear regulation, legal censorship, access to information and libel laws. Islamist groups in Tripoli controlled a number of former state media, and a number of private channels, and Libya Al-Hurrah is viewed as an affiliate of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. The regional power struggle is reflected in the media landscape, with Qatar based media supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE supporting all other groups (liberal, Salafist, and tribal groups). Freedom House, <i>Freedom of the Press 2015</i> (Washington, DC. : Freedom House,, 2015) Rami Musa, <i>Media Landscapes: Libya</i> (Brussels: European Journalism Centre, 2017).	107 Community Meeting, Tripoli
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		120 Community Meeting Ajdabiya, 27 October 2018
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		123 FGDoo8 - Mixed Gender - Sabha - 15 December 2018
		124 Community Meeting 1 Benghazi - 13 October 2018
		125 KIlo18-M_Ajdabiya, politician
		126 FGDoo4-F Ajdabiya
		127 KIlo38-F_Tripoli, 48 years old
		128 FGDoo8 - Mixed Gender - Sabha - 15 December 2018
		129 KIlo15-F_Ajdabiya, legal professional
		130 Community Meeting 4- Mixed Gender, Sabha - 16 December 2018

131	FGDoo3-Mixed Gender, Benghazi 19 December 2018	156	FGDoo7-Mixed Gender - Tripoli - Students - 27 October 2018
132	KIlo32-F_Tripoli, 46 years old	157	Community Meeting 2 Ajdabiya
133	KIlo40-M_Tripoli, 25 years old	158	KIlo64-F Benghazi
134	KIlo63-F Sabha, 52 years old	159	Community Meeting 2 Ajdabiya
135	Community Meeting 4, Sabha, 16 December 2018	160	Community Meeting 4 Sabha - 16 December 2018
136	KIlo05-F_Benghazi; KIlo05-F_Benghazi, KIlo03-M_Benghazi, Businessman	161	Community Meeting 4 Sabha, 16 December 2018
137	Alia Brahimi, "Why Libya Is Still a Global Terror Threat," <i>The Guardian</i> , 25 May, 2016. Al Rakoba, "Daesh Focuses on "Jihad Al-Niqah" and Recruits Women from African Countries Including the Sudan," <i>Al Rakoba</i> , , 2 May, 2016. Al Rakoba, "Daesh Focuses on "Jihad Al-Niqah". Against Terrorism, "The "Jihad of Marriage" Is a Way to Appeal to the Women of Libya," <i>Against Terrorism</i> : not dated. Human Rights Watch, <i>We Feel We Are Cursed, Life under Isis in Sirte, Libya</i> ; RT, "Foreign Fighters in Libya: The Fourth Largest Mobilization of Fighters in the History of Terrorism," <i>RT</i> , 26 February, 2018. Monia Ghanmi, "The Strategy of 'Daesh' for Staying in Libya: Recruiting Women and Exploiting Them," <i>Arabic CNN</i> , 23 February, 2016	162	FGDoo7-Mixed Gender – Tripoli – 27 October 2018
138	KIlo22-F_Ajdabiya	163	Community Meeting 4 Sabha, 16 December 2018
139	FGDoo7-Mixed Gender - Tripoli - Students - 27 October 2018	164	FGDoo1-F_Benghazi, 3 November 2018
140	FGDoo2-Mixed Gender, Benghazi, 8 November 2018	165	FGDoo1-F_Benghazi, 3 November 2018
141	Nelly Lahoud, Empowerment or Subjugation: An Analysis of ISIL's Gender Messaging. New York: UN Women	166	FGDoo3-Mixed Gender, Benghazi 19 December 2018
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145	KIlo19-M_Ajdabiya, Lecturer	170	FGDoo7-Mixed Gender - Tripoli - Students - 27 October 2018
146	KIlo08-F_Benghazi, Legal Professional	171	Community Meeting 3 Tripoli,
147	KIlo17-F_Ajdabiya, Housewife	172	FGDoo7-Mixed Gender - Tripoli - Students - 27 October 2018
148	KIlo16-M_Ajdabiya, Lecturer	173	FGDoo1-F_Benghazi, 3 November 2018
149	KIlo15-F_Ajdabiya, Activist	174	FGDoo2-Mixed Gender, Benghazi, 8 November 2018; FGDoo3-Mixed Gender, Benghazi 19 December 2018; KIlo21-M_Ajdabiya, High School Student; FGDoo3-Mixed Gender, Benghazi 19 December 2018; FGDoo4-F Ajdabiya
150	KIlo23-F_Ajdabiya, Public servant	175	Community Meeting 2 Ajdabiya
151	KIlo06-F_Benghazi, Teacher and a member of a women-only koranic study group	176	KIlo06-F_Benghazi
152	FGDoo3-Mixed Gender, Benghazi 19 December 2018	177	KIlo21-M_Ajdabiya, high school teacher
153	KIlo64-F Benghazi	178	KIlo24 F_Ajdabiya, teacher
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155	Community Meeting 3 Tripoli	180	FGDoo3-Mixed Gender, Benghazi 19 December 2018
		181	FGDoo1-F_Benghazi, 3 November 2018
		182	FGDoo5-Mixed Gender, Ajdabiya
		183	FGDoo5-Mixed Gender, Ajdabiya
		184	KIlo10-F_Benghazi teacher, member of a woman-only Koranic study group
		185	Abdul Latif, <i>Libya Status of Women Survey 2013</i> , 57.
		186	KIlo49-F Sabha, 40 years old

- 187 K11052-F Sabha, 53 years old
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## 7.0

# GLOSSARY

Term	Definition
Benevolent Sexism	Protection of women; veneration of women's reproductive capacity
Extremism	The adoption of extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo and/or reject or oppose other contemporary ideas and norms that are generally agreed upon including human rights, especially women's human rights, freedom of expression, democracy and so on, and the use of coercive control within institutions to force compliance with religious conservative norms.
Fundamentalism	The belief of an individual or a group of individuals in the absolute authority of a sacred religious text or teachings of a particular religious leader, prophet, and/ or God.
Gender-regressive ideologies	Gender-regressive ideologies are those that seek to impose a hierarchical gender order, often based on religious or cultural justifications, limiting the human rights of women with respect to civil and family status, political, economic and social rights. The descriptive adjective "gender regressive" is often used by feminist economists to describe the effects of state policies and practices on limiting or damaging women's rights.
Hostile Sexism	Men's entitlement to use violence and dominate sexual relations; men's belief that without male control women are dangerous
Misogyny	Both fear and hatred of women and/or the feminine
Radicalization	A process wherein a person comes to subscribe to a doctrine of fundamentalism, extremism, or violent extremism.
Violent extremism	The use of violence by an organised militia groups or cells, often targeted at civilians, intended to pursue religious conservative ideological and political causes in which gender regressive ideology plays a key role.

## 8.0

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## 9.0

# APPENDICES

## 9.1

### Survey

- |        |   |     |  |
|--------|---|-----|--|
| Q1     | What is your age in years? (e.g. 25)  | Q11 | Below are some social media contents. Please let us know how often do you see those? - Intolerant towards minority groups  |
| Q2     | What is your gender?  | Q12 | Below are some social media contents. Please let us know how often do you see those? - Inciting violence towards religious minorities                                    |
| Q2R1   | What is your gender? - Other  | Q13 | Below are some social media contents. Please let us know how often do you see those? - Inciting violence towards ethnic minorities                                       |
| Q3     | What is your highest level of education?  | Q14 | Below are some social media contents. Please let us know how often do you see those? - Inciting violence towards women and girls   |
| Q4     | What is your marital status?  | Q15 | Below are some social media contents. Please let us know how often do you see those? - Violent extremist groups trying to recruit members through social media           |
| Q5     | What is your current employment status?   | Q16 | Below are the descriptors of personal traits. - Strong personality   |
| Q5R1   | What is your current employment status? - Other, please write here  | Q17 | Below are the descriptors of personal traits. - Dominant   |
| Q6     | What is your personal average monthly income (in Libyan Dinar)?   | Q18 | Below are the descriptors of personal traits. - Assertive  |
| Q7     | What is the approximate total monthly household income (in Libyan Dinar) in the household where you live? | Q19 | Below are the descriptors of personal traits. - Defend own beliefs   |
| Q8     | How many people live in your house?   | Q20 | Below are the descriptors of personal traits. - Forceful   |
| Q9     | In general, how religious do you consider yourself to be?   | Q21 | Below are the descriptors of personal traits. - Aggressive   |
| Q10r1  | What kind of social media do you use? - Facebook  | Q22 | Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Women exaggerate problems they have with looking after the family |
| Q10r2  | What kind of social media do you use? - Facebook Messenger  |     |  |
| Q10r3  | What kind of social media do you use? - Twitter   |     |  |
| Q10r4  | What kind of social media do you use? - Snapchat  |     |  |
| Q10r5  | What kind of social media do you use? - Instagram   |     |  |
| Q10r6  | What kind of social media do you use? - Tinder  |     |  |
| Q10r7  | What kind of social media do you use? - Grindr  |     |  |
| Q10r8  | What kind of social media do you use? - WhatsApp  |     |  |
| Q10r9  | What kind of social media do you use? - Telegram  |     |  |
| Q10r10 | What kind of social media do you use? - Line  |     |  |
| Q10r11 | What kind of social media do you use? - Other   |     |  |
| Q10r12 | What kind of social media do you use? - Other   |     |  |

- Q23 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Women's rights activists are seeking for women to have more power than men.
- Q24 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as sexual harassment.
- Q25 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality".
- Q26 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - It is generally safer not to trust women too much.
- Q27 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - When I am in a group consisting of equal numbers of men and women and a woman dominates the conversation I feel uncomfortable.
- Q28 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
- Q29 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
- Q30 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.
- Q31 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
- Q32 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Women tend to have a superior moral sensibility than men.
- Q33 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection.
- Q34 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Women need a male guardian to protect the honour of their family.
- Q35 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - In a previous meeting in the community, we asked one woman, Nesrin, about her views on women and men's roles in the household. She said, "I think women should manage the home and be responsible for raising the children. When they start joining politics that just provokes men." How much do you agree with Nesrin's views?
- Q36 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - Another woman, Ghady, had a different view to Nesrin. She said: "Women joining politics, that's good. Women know how to manage households and families, and have education now to manage the country." How much do you agree with Ghady's statement?
- Q37 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - Men join violent extremist groups because they support ideas like "women should be obedient to their husbands". How much do you agree with this statement?
- Q38 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members.

- Q39 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they want to support what they see as a 'just cause'.
- Q40 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - When women join a violent extremist group, it is in part because that group offers them money.
- Q41 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - When men join a violent extremist group, it is in part because that group offers them money.
- Q42 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - Women who face violence from their husbands, fathers, or brothers are more likely to join a violent extremist group.
- Q43 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - Women who have been raped or sexually abused are more likely to join a violent extremist group.
- Q44 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - Women more likely to join a violent extremist group to avoid rape or abuse.
- Q45 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - Young men join extremist groups to pay dowry (money or good or animals to the groom's family) or bride-price (money or good or animals to the bride's family).
- Q46 We have recently conducted interviews with a number of different people from the local community, and asked a number of different questions about violent extremism. For example, we asked one person in the local community the following question. "Do you think that violent extremism is justified in order to protect your religious views?" The person's response was: "Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the need for violence to defend your religious views?
- Q47 We have recently conducted interviews with a number of different people from the local community, and asked a number of different questions about violent extremism. For example, we asked one person in the local community the following question. "Do you think that violent extremism is justified in order to protect your religious views?" The person's response was: "Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - How much do you personally support this person's views?
- Q48 We have recently conducted interviews with a number of different people from the local community, and asked a number of different questions about violent extremism. For example, we asked one person in the local community the following question. "Do you think that violent extremism is justified in order to protect your religious views?" The person's response was: "Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - The views of this person are common among Men in your community.
- Q49 We have recently conducted interviews with a number of different people from the local community, and asked a number of different questions about violent extremism. For example, we asked one person in the local community the following question. "Do you think that violent extremism is justified in order to protect your religious views?" The person's response was: "Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - The views of this person are common among Women in your community.
- Q50 We have recently conducted interviews with a number of different people from the local community, and asked a number of different questions about violent extremism. For example, we asked one person in the local community the following question. "Do you think that violent extremism is justified in order to protect your religious views?" The person's response was: "Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - The views of this person are common among young people (18-35) in your community.

- Q51 We asked another general question, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person’s response was: “Sometimes violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address inequality and the standard of living of the people” - How much do you agree with this person’s view regarding the need for violence to address inequality?
- Q52 We asked another general question, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person’s response was: “Sometimes violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address inequality and the standard of living of the people” - How much do you personally support this persons views?
- Q53 We asked another general question, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person’s response was: “Sometimes violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address inequality and the standard of living of the people” - The views of this person are common among Men in your community.
- Q54 We asked another general question, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person’s response was: “Sometimes violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address inequality and the standard of living of the people” - The views of this person are common among Women in your community.
- Q55 We asked another general question, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person’s response was: “Sometimes violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address inequality and the standard of living of the people” - The views of this person are common among young people (18-35) in your community.
- Q56 We asked the same general question to a different person, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person said: “Violence is never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!” - How much do you agree with this person’s view regarding violence never being a solution and the need to stop extremist groups?
- Q57 We asked the same general question to a different person, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person said: “Violence is Never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!” - How much do you personally support this person’s views?
- Q58 We asked the same general question to a different person, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person said: “Violence is never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!” - The views of this person are common among men in your community.
- Q59 We asked the same general question to a different person, “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community? ”This person said: “Violence is never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!” - The views of this person are common among women in your community.
- Q60 We asked the same general question to a different person; “is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community?”This person said: “Violence is never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!” - The views of this person are common among young people in your community.
- Q61 We interviewed Hala about warnings signs of radicalisation. Hala said, “Yes, I can tell when a family or someone have become extremist because they insist that women dress more conservatively. For instance, they start by saying women should be fully covered or that they should wear the Niqab, which we don’t have here usually”. How much do you agree with Hala’s statement?

- Q62 Universities and schools are often the sites of conflict over gender politics. One student, Hassan, told us: “One sign of extremism is when groups start protesting to segregate university classes into men and women or boys and girls. They always want men and women to be separate”. How much do you agree with Hassan’s statement?
- Q63 Another woman, Asma, linked violence to women politicians as a warning sign. She said, “I can tell when there will be extremist violence because militia start to attack women leaders”. How much do you agree with Asma’s statement?
- Q64 Fairouz told us that she felt worried when she saw men, even young men, with “prayer bumps” or bruises (zabība) on their foreheads to show they prayed very often and vigorously. She said, “More of these very devout men around tells me that there is more extremism” How much do you agree with Fairouz’s statement?
- Q65 Younes described meetings outside the regular mosque as indicators for extremism. Younes said, “I know that when groups of people are meeting to discuss religious and political matters but do not join us at the mainstream mosque or talk with our Imam, that they are engaging in extremist discussions, which could become actions”. How much do you agree with Younes’ statement?
- Q66 Habib told us that an early warning sign of extremism is an increase in groups performing charitable work. Habib said the first sign he noticed is that “in the poor neighbourhoods violent extremist groups welcome people, they perform charitable works that the state doesn’t do: caravans bringing food aid, assistance and clothes”. How much do you agree with Habib’s statement?
- Q67 Saif said that warning sign of rising violent extremist was an increase in militias patrolling. He said, “A sign of rising extremism is when you have armed men wearing Afghani-style clothes stopping people in the street to give orders”. How much do you agree with Saif’s statement?
- Q68 Abir described how she first noticed violent extremist when young people had more money to spend: “for a long time, no one had any money. Suddenly, these young people had money to spend in the shops and restaurants.” How much do you agree with Abir’s statement?
- Q69 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I am concerned about rising intolerance towards religious and/or ethnic minorities in my community
- Q70 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights (e.g. rights to work, travel alone, voice their opinion in public).
- Q71 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I am concerned about violent extremism in my country.
- Q72 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I am concerned about violent extremism in my community
- Q73 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I am concerned that violent extremism is on the rise in my country.
- Q74 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my family.
- Q75 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my community
- Q76 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I trust the police in my community to counter or prevent violent extremism

- Q77 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to the police
- Q78 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to a community leader
- Q79 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you disagree or agree with each statement. - I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to a religious leader
- Q80 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) by husbands towards wives can be excused in some situations.
- Q81 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Most women could leave a violent relationship if they really wanted to
- Q82 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Women should always tell their husbands when they are going out
- Q83 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him.
- Q84 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - A husband is entitled to use physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) if his wife doesn't keep up with domestic chores, including looking after the children.
- Q85 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - A husband is entitled to use physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) if his wife goes out without telling him.
- Q86 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to.
- Q87 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old.
- Q88 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - A father is entitled to receive a bride-price (money goods and animals paid to the bride's family) for his daughter.
- Q89 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Parents are entitled to circumcise their male children.
- Q90 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Parents are entitled to circumcise their female children.
- Q91 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - If a daughter has a relationship with an unsuitable man, her father or brother is entitled to use physical force/violence to punish her for bringing dishonour on the family.

## 9.2

### Focus Group Discussions

Code	Gender	Site	Notes	Date
FGD001	Female	Benghazi		3 November 2018
FGD002	Mixed Gender	Benghazi		8 November 2018
FGD003	Mixed Gender	Benghazi		19 December 2018
FGD004	Female	Ajdabiya		15 November 2018
FGD005	Female	Ajdabiya		24 November 2018
FGD006	Mixed Gender	Tripoli	Students	10 December 2018
FGD007	Mixed Gender	Tripoli	Students	27 October 2018
FGD008	Mixed Gender	Sabha		15 December 2018
FGD009	Female	Sabha		26 November 2018

## 9.3

### Key Informant Interviews

Code	Sex	Site	Age	Organization	Notes	Education Level
KII001	Female	Benghazi	NA	House of Representatives	Politician	Ph.D., sociology
KII002	Male	Benghazi	NA	Council of the Elders of Libya	Politician	Diploma Education
KII003	Male	Benghazi	NA		Businessman	Master
KII004	Male	Benghazi	NA	University	Lecturer	Ph.D.
KII005	Female	Benghazi	NA	Public Servant	Director	Diploma Business Administration
KII006	Female	Benghazi	NA	Women's prayer group	Teacher	BA Education
KII007	Female	Benghazi	NA	Public Servant	Education Expert	BS Social Psychology
KII008	Female	Benghazi	NA	Public Servant	Legal Professional	Master of Public Law
KII009	Male	Benghazi	NA	Public Servant	Education Expert	Higher education Diploma
KII010	Female	Benghazi	NA	Women's prayer group	Teacher	BS Psychology
KII011	Female	Benghazi	NA	Public Servant	Legal Professional	NA

Code	Sex	Site	Age	Organization	Notes	Education Level
KII012	Female	Benghazi	NA	Public Servant	Legal Professional	NA
KII013	Female	Benghazi	NA	Public Servant	Prison Employee	NA
KII014	Female	Ajdabiya	NA	University	Lecturer	NA
KII015	Female	Ajdabiya	NA	NA	Civil Society Activist	Master of Law
KII016	Male	Ajdabiya	NA	University	Lecturer	NA
KII017	Female	Ajdabiya	NA	NA	Housewife	NA
KII018	Male	Ajdabiya	NA	NA	Politician	NA
KII019	Male	Ajdabiya	NA	NA	Na	Ph.D.
KII020	Female	Ajdabiya	NA	NA	Lecturer	NA
KII021	Male	Ajdabiya	18	NA	School Student	High School
KII022	Female	Ajdabiya	25	NA	University Student	Bachelor of Law
KII023	Female	Ajdabiya	NA	Public Servant	Social Assistant	Bachelor of Economics
KII024	Female	Ajdabiya	NA	NA	Intermediate Institute	NA
KII025	Female	Ajdabiya	NA	NA	Housewife / Citizen	NA
KII026	Male	Ajdabiya	NA	NA	Trader / Businessman	NA
KII027	Female	Tripoli	45	Public Servant	Social Worker	Bachelor Degree
KII028	Female	Tripoli	55	Citizen	Na	Bachelor Degree
KII029	Female	Tripoli	42	Citizen	Employed	Bachelor Degree
KII030	Female	Tripoli	26	Citizen	Unemployed	Bachelor Degree
KII031	Female	Tripoli	23	Citizen	Recent Graduate	Bachelor Degree
KII032	Female	Tripoli	46	Citizen	Employed	Bachelor Degree
KII033	Female	Tripoli	23	Citizen	Recent Graduate	Bachelor Degree
KII034	Female	Tripoli	20	Citizen	A Widow From Benghazi That Married A Man From Misrata Who Was Killed In Sirte.	Middle School
KII035	Female	Tripoli	23	Citizen	Student	University
KII036	Male	Tripoli	21	Citizen	Student	University
KII037	Female	Tripoli	54	Citizen	Na	NA
KII038	Female	Tripoli	48	Citizen	Na	NA
KII039	Male	Tripoli	30	Citizen	Na	NA
KII040	Male	Tripoli	25	Citizen	Na	NA

Code	Sex	Site	Age	Organization	Notes	Education Level
KII041	Female	Tripoli	35	Citizen	Na	NA
KII042	Male	Tripoli	36	Citizen	Na	NA
KII043	Female	Tripoli	44	Citizen	Na	NA
KII044	Female	Tripoli	48	Citizen	Na	NA
KII045	Female	Tripoli	43	Citizen	Na	NA
KII046	Female	Tripoli	26	Citizen	Na	NA
KII047	Female	Tripoli	43	Citizen	Widow that married a VE member from the East	NA
KII048	Female	Sabha	45	Citizen	Na	NA
KII049	Female	Sabha	40	Citizen	Na	NA
KII050	Female	Sabha	50	Citizen	Na	NA
KII051	Female	Sabha	34	Citizen	Na	NA
KII052	Female	Sabha	53	Citizen	Na	NA
KII053	Female	Sabha	60	Citizen	Housewife	High school
KII054	Female	Sabha	40	Citizen	Na	NA
KII055	Female	Sabha	35	Citizen	Na	NA
KII056	Female	Sabha	53	Citizen	Na	NA
KII057	Female	Sabha	56	Citizen	Na	NA
KII058	Female	Sabha	51	Citizen	Housewife	Middle school
KII059	Female	Sabha	44	Citizen	Employed	High school
KII060	Female	Sabha	50	Citizen	Housewife	Mosque school
KII061	Female	Sabha	47	Citizen	Housewife	Middle school
KII062	Female	Sabha	50	Citizen	Employed	High school
KII063	Female	Sabha	52	Citizen	Housewife	Middle school
KII064	Female	Benghazi	NA	University	Academic Expert	PhD
KII065	Female	Tripoli	NA	University	Academic Expert	PhD

## 9.4 Community Meetings

Code	Site	Date
Community Meeting 1	Benghazi	13 October 2018
Community Meeting 2	Ajdabiya	27 October
Community Meeting 3	Tripoli	
Community Meeting 4	Sabha	16 December 2018

## 9.5

### Ambivalent Sexism Scale

#### Hostile sexism scale comprised 6 items:

- Q22 Women exaggerate problems they have with looking after the family
- Q23 Women's rights activists are seeking for women to have more power than men
- Q24 Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as sexual harassment.
- Q25 Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality".
- Q26 It is generally safer not to trust women too much
- Q27 When I am in a group consisting of equal numbers of men and women and a woman dominates the conversation I feel uncomfortable

#### The benevolent sexism scale comprised 6 items:

- Q28 The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men
- Q29 The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men
- Q30 Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores
- Q31 Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives
- Q32 Women tend to have a superior moral sensibility than men
- Q33 Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection

## 9.6

### Attitudes to Violence Against Women Scale

#### The Supporting Violence Against Women scale comprised 4 items:

- Q80 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - Physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) by husbands towards wives can be excused in some situations.
- Q83 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him or refuses to obey him.
- Q84 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree

- with each statement. - A husband is entitled to use physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) if his wife doesn't keep up with domestic chores, including looking after the children
- Q85 Please read the statements below and indicate how much do you agree or disagree with each statement. - A husband is entitled to use physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) if his wife goes out without telling him.

## 9.7

### Support for Cultural Practices that Harm Women and Girls Scale

- |     |  |     |  |
|-----|--|-----|--|
| Q82 | Women should always tell their husbands when they are going out  | Q88 | A father is entitled to receive a bride-price (money goods and animals paid to the bride's family) for his daughter. |
| Q87 | A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old. | Q90 | Parents are entitled to circumcise their female children   |

## 9.8

### Support for Violent Extremism Scale

The Support for Violent Extremism Scale comprised question 46, 47, 51, 52

- |     |  |     |   |
|-----|--|-----|---|
| Q46 | “Do you think that violent extremism is justified in order to protect your religious views?”The person’s response was: “Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them.” - How much do you agree with this person’s view regarding the need for violence to defend your religious views? | Q51 | “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community?”This person’s response was: “Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the standard of living of the people” - How much do you agree with this person’s view regarding the need for violence to address inequality? |
| Q47 | “Do you think that violent extremism is justified in order to protect your religious views?”The person’s response was: “Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them.” - How much do you personally support this persons views?  | Q52 | “Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community?”This person’s response was: “Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the standard of living of the people” - How much do you personally support this persons views?   |

## 9.9 Pearson Correlation - Whole Sample

	Hostile Sexism	Benevolent Sexism	Support Violent Extremism	Support VAW	Support Cultural Practices that harm women	Age	Education	Employment Status (Unemployed)	Personal Income	Household Income	Number of cohabitants	Religiosity
Hostile Sexism	1											
	860											
Benevolent Sexism	0.276*	1										
	783	873										
Support Violent Extremism	0.0518	0.1882*	1									
	752	749	838									
Support VAW	0.2063*	0.2050*	0.3041*	1								
	792	798	779	897								
Support for cultural practices that harm women	0.1875*	0.1797*	0.1852*	0.5584*	1							
	763	765	748	815	856							
Age (Ascending)	0.0197	-0.0881*	-0.2238*	-0.1767*	-0.0625	1						
	860	873	838	897	856	1007						
Education	0.0662	-0.0401	-0.1527*	-0.1420*	-0.1251*	0.0334	1					
	860	873	838	897	856	1007	1007					
Employment Status (Unemployed)	-0.0181	0.0437	0.1944*	0.1476*	0.0713*	-0.6072*	-0.1240*	1				
	860	873	838	897	856	1007	1007	1007				
Personal Income	0.0235	-0.051	-0.1384*	-0.1462*	-0.1153*	0.4768*	0.1605*	-0.7269*	1			
	860	873	838	897	856	1007	1007	1007	1007			
Household Income	-0.0307	-0.03	-0.0885*	-0.1010*	-0.0821*	0.1085*	0.1972*	-0.2678*	0.4676*	1		
	860	873	838	897	856	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007		
People in house	0.0139	0.0564	0.0978*	0.1077*	0.0914*	-0.2155*	-0.0638*	0.2214*	-0.2333*	-0.031	1	
	860	873	838	897	856	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	
Religiosity	0.0175	-0.0073	-0.0282	-0.0401	0.0226	0.2265*	0.0496	-0.1886*	0.1409*	0.0836*	-0.0638*	1
	860	873	838	897	856	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007

\*correlation is significant at the 95% level.

9.10

Calculated Value of the Chi-Square Test: Scales and Questions

Scale/Question	By gender		By age	
	Ho: There is no difference between the two population proportions: Men and women do not significantly differ in their perceptions about VE		Ho: There is no difference between the two population proportions: Youth and adults do not significantly differ in their perceptions about VE	
	Chi-square test	Decision	Chi-square test	Decision
Hostile	Pearson chiz(3) = 6.6287 Pr=0.085	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 1.0422 Pr=0.791	Not reject Ho
Benevolent	Pearson chiz(3) = 13.0649 Pr=0.004	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 17.6182 Pr=0.001	Reject Ho
Support VE	Pearson chiz(3) = 8.1478 Pr=0.043	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 37.9080 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho
Male Support in Community	Pearson chiz(3) = 10.4415 Pr=0.015	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 31.8687 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho
Female Support in Community	Pearson chiz(3) = 3.9115 Pr=0.271	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 32.3231 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho
Young support in Community	Pearson chiz(3) = 1.7720 Pr=0.621	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 15.8021 Pr=0.001	Reject Ho
Gendered Warning Signs	Pearson chiz(3) = 13.8333 Pr=0.003	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 5.4204 Pr=0.143	Not reject Ho
Gender Neutral Warning Signs	Pearson chiz(3) = 10.1824 Pr=0.017	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 8.0499 Pr=0.045	Reject Ho
VAW	Pearson chiz(3) = 18.4343 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 19.6917 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho
Coercive control	Pearson chiz(3) = 7.9151 Pr=0.048	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(3) = 12.6901 Pr=0.005	Reject Ho

Ambivalent Sexism + Misogyny Scale					
Q22. Women exaggerate problems they have with looking after the family	Pearson chiz(4) =14.4493 Pr= 0.006	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =2.6498 Pr= 0.618	Not reject Ho	
Q23. Women's rights activists are seeking for women to have more power than men.	Pearson chiz(4) =7.1471 Pr=0.128	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =10.5217 Pr= 0.032	Reject Ho	
Q24. Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as sexual harassment.	Pearson chiz(4) =22.1853 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =18.5712 Pr=0.001	Reject Ho	
Q25. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality".	Pearson chiz(4) = 29.5362 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =10.7738 Pr= 0.029	Reject Ho	
Q26. It is generally safer not to trust women too much.	Pearson chiz(4) =15.0725 Pr=0.005	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =17.1106 Pr= 0.002	Reject Ho	
Q27. When I am in a group consisting of equal numbers of men and women and a woman dominates the conversation I feel uncomfortable.	Pearson chiz(4) =13.6346 Pr= 0.009	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =12.5265 Pr= 0.014	Reject Ho	
Q28. The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.	Pearson chiz(4) =39.7861 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 24.5114 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	
Q29. The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.	Pearson chiz(4) =116.6332 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =27.4437 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	
Q30. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.	Pearson chiz(4) = 5.0102 Pr= 0.286	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =43.7101 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	
Q31. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.	Pearson chiz(4) =4.9784 Pr= 0.290	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 23.1653 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	
Q32. Women tend to have a superior moral sensibility than men.	Pearson chiz(4) =5.7749 Pr= 0.217	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =28.5677 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	
Q33. Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection.	Pearson chiz(4) = 15.0690 Pr= 0.005	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =28.4349 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	
Q34. Women need a male guardian to protect the honour of their family.	Pearson chiz(4) =16.4817 Pr= 0.002	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 21.1917 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	

Gender identities and links with intolerance, violence and extremism					
Q35: "I think women should manage the home and be responsible for raising the children. When they start joining politics that just provokes men." How much do you agree with Nesrin's views?	Pearson chiz(4) = 3.1077 Pr= 0.540	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =21.3891 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	
Q36: "Women joining politics, that's good. Women know how to manage households and families, and have education now to manage the country." How much do you agree with Ghady's statement?	Pearson chiz(4) =58.7976 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =8.7925 Pr= 0.066	Not reject Ho	
Q37: Men join violent extremist groups because they support ideas like "women should be obedient to their husbands". How much do you agree with this statement?	Pearson chiz(4) =17.1127 Pr= 0.002	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =14.8769 Pr= 0.005	Reject Ho	
Q38: When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members.	Pearson chiz(4) =4.9911 Pr= 0.288	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =12.3657 Pr=0.015	Reject Ho	
Q39: When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they want to support what they see as a 'just cause'.	Pearson chiz(4) =5.0829 Pr= 0.279	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =11.9083 Pr= 0.018	Reject Ho	
Q40: When women join a violent extremist group, it is in part because that group offers them money.	Pearson chiz(4) =8.9992 Pr=0.061	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 9.2782 Pr= 0.055	Not reject Ho	
Q41: When men join a violent extremist group, it is in part because that group offers them money.	Pearson chiz(4) =6.9468 Pr= 0.139	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =14.8383 Pr= 0.005	Reject Ho	
Q42: Women who face violence from their husbands, fathers, or brothers are more likely to join a violent extremist group.	Pearson chiz(4) =10.1362 Pr= 0.038	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 14.3078 Pr= 0.006	Reject Ho	
Q43: Women who have been raped or sexually abused are more likely to join a violent extremist group.	Pearson chiz(4) = 1.8857 Pr= 0.757	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =17.3857 Pr= 0.002	Reject Ho	
Q44: Women more likely to join a VE group to avoid rape or abuse.	Pearson chiz(4) = 4.8230 Pr= 0.306	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =15.5982 Pr= 0.004	Reject Ho	
Q45: Young men join extremist groups to pay dowry (money or good or animals to the groom's family) or bride-price (money or good or animals to the bride's family).	Pearson chiz(4) = 2.0111 Pr= 0.734	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 15.8408 Pr= 0.003	Reject Ho	

Support for VCE						
Q46. "Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the need for violence to defend your religious views?	Pearson chiz(4) =14.5900	Pr= 0.006	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =273768	Pr=0.000	Reject Ho
Q47. "Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - How much do you personally support this persons views?	Pearson chiz(4) = 8.9444	Pr= 0.063	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =29.3146	Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho
Q48. "Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - The views of this person are common among men in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) =1.7292	Pr= 0.785	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 14.0392	Pr= 0.007	Reject Ho
Q49. Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - The views of this person are common among women in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) = 1.6342	Pr= 0.803	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 20.7522	Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho
Q50. Yes, if someone criticises or undermines our religion and what it stands for, then it is ok to use violence against them." - The views of this person are common among young people (18-35) in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) = 2.8474	Pr= 0.584	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 7.9789	Pr= 0.092	Not reject Ho
Q51. Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the standard of living of the people" - How much do you agree with this person's view regarding the need for violence to address inequality?	Pearson chiz(4) = 12.8991	Pr= 0.012	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =56.3256	Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho
Q52. Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the standard of living of the people" - How much do you personally support this persons views?	Pearson chiz(4) = 2.2080	Pr= 0.698	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 61.5716	Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho
Q53. Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the standard of living of the people" - The views of this person are common among men in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) =17.0517	Pr= 0.002	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =32.9650	Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho

Q54. Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the standard of living of the people" - The views of this person are common among women in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) = 7.1159 Pr= 0.130	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 28.5314 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho
Q55. Sometime violence and extremist attacks are needed in order to address the inequality and address the standard of living of the people" - The views of this person are common among young people (18-35) in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) = 4.1614 Pr=0.385	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 21.5437 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho
Q56. Violence is Never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!" - How much do you agree with this person's view regarding violence never being a solution and the need to stop extremist groups?	Pearson chiz(4) = 10.0956 Pr= 0.039	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 21.8539 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho
Q57. Violence is never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!" - How much do you personally support this persons views?	Pearson chiz(4) = 8.5341 Pr= 0.074	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =19.2130 Pr= 0.001	Reject Ho
Q58. Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community?"This person said: "Violence is never a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!" - The views of this person are common among men in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) =16.6741 Pr=0.002	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 17.5208 Pr=0.002	Reject Ho
Q59. Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community?"This person said: "Violence is mever a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!" - The views of this person are common among Women in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) = 5.8404 Pr=0.211	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) =10.4730 Pr=0.033	Reject Ho
Q60. Is violent extremism necessary in order to bring about change in your community?"This person said: "Violence is mever a solution to problems, and extremist groups need to be stopped!" - The views of this person are common among young people in your community.	Pearson chiz(4) =5.0470 Pr=0.283	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 17.1107 Pr=0.002	Reject Ho

Gendered warning signs				
Q61. Yes, I can tell when a family or someone have become extremist because they insist that women dress more conservatively. For instance, they start by saying women should be fully covered or that they should wear the Niqab, which we don't have here usually". How much do you agree with Hala's statement?	Pearson chiz(4) = 7.4793 Pr=0.113	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 14.6562 Pr=0.005	Reject Ho
Q62. "One sign of extremism is when groups start protesting to segregate university classes into men and women or boys and girls. They always want men and women to be separate". How much do you agree with Hassan's statement?	Pearson chiz(4) = 14.3641 Pr= 0.006	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 7.3329 Pr=0.119	Not reject Ho
Q63. I can tell when there will be extremist violence because militia start to attack women leaders". How much do you agree with Asma's statement?	Pearson chiz(4) = 17.3622 Pr=0.002	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 7.4965 Pr=0.112	Not reject Ho
Q64. "More of these very devout men around tells me that there is more extremism" How much do you agree with Fairouz's statement?	Pearson chiz(4) = 8.5630 Pr=0.073	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 4.2260 Pr=0.376	Not reject Ho
Q65. "I know that when groups of people are meeting to discuss religious and political matters but do not join us at the mainstream mosque or talk with our Imam, that they are engaging in extremist discussions, which could become actions. "How much do you agree with Younes' statement?	Pearson chiz(4) = 10.0374 Pr=0.040	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 3.7599 Pr=0.439	Not reject Ho
Q66. "In the poor neighbourhoods violent extremist groups welcome people, they perform charitable works that the state doesn't do: caravans bringing food aid, assistance and clothes". How much do you agree with Habib's statement?	Pearson chiz(4) = 6.8985 Pr=0.141	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 4.0406 Pr=0.401	Not reject Ho
Q67. "A sign of rising extremism is when you have armed men wearing Afghani-style clothes stopping people in the street to give orders". How much do you agree with Saif's statement?	Pearson chiz(4) = 2.0932 Pr=0.719	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 16.3589 Pr= 0.003	Reject Ho
Q68. "for a long time, no one had any money. Suddenly, these young people had money to spend in the shops and restaurants." How much do you agree with Abir's statement?	Pearson chiz(4) = 20.4159 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 16.3812 Pr=0.003	Reject Ho

Support for P-CVE						
Q69. I am concerned about rising intolerance towards religious and/or ethnic minorities in my community	Pearson chiz(4) = 8.1644 Pr= 0.086	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 17.3008 Pr= 0.002	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q70. I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women's rights (e.g. rights to work, travel alone, voice their opinion in public).	Pearson chiz(4) = 28.6730 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 12.5570 Pr= 0.014	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q71. I am concerned about violent extremism in my country.	Pearson chiz(4) = 20.7963 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 38.4186 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q72. I am concerned about violent extremism in my community	Pearson chiz(4) = 23.1431 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 19.8485 Pr= 0.001	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q73. I am concerned that violent extremism is on the rise in my country.	Pearson chiz(4) = 17.2388 Pr= 0.002	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 13.6005 Pr= 0.009	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q74. I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my family.	Pearson chiz(4) = 20.2414 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 25.5143 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q75. I know what to do in order to prevent violent extremism in my community.	Pearson chiz(4) = 9.9251 Pr= 0.042	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 19.0033 Pr= 0.001	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q76. I trust the police in my community to counter or prevent violent extremism.	Pearson chiz(4) = 7.9323 Pr= 0.094	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 48.7139 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q77. I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to the police.	Pearson chiz(4) = 8.0413 Pr= 0.090	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 28.3424 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q78. I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to a community leader.	Pearson chiz(4) = 8.6485 Pr= 0.071	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 16.2857 Pr= 0.003	Reject Ho		Reject Ho
Q79. I would feel confident in reporting violent extremism to a religious leader.	Pearson chiz(4) = 4.6362 Pr= 0.327	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 4.6018 Pr= 0.331	Not reject Ho		Not reject Ho

Support for VAW					
Q80. Physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) by husbands towards wives can be excused in some situations.	Pearson chiz(4) = 25.1012 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 8.5243 Pr=0.074	Not reject Ho	
Q81. Most women could leave a violent relationship if they really wanted to.	Pearson chiz(4) = 24.8570 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 10.4375 Pr=0.034	Reject Ho	
Q82. Women should always tell their husbands when they are going out.	Pearson chiz(4) = 5.3214 Pr= 0.256	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 4.4111 Pr=0.353	Not reject Ho	
Q83. A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him.	Pearson chiz(4) = 37.6165 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 12.8949 Pr=0.012	Reject Ho	
Q84. A husband is entitled to use physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) if his wife doesn't keep up with domestic chores, including looking after the children.	Pearson chiz(4) = 27.7596 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 20.6128 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho	
Q85. A husband is entitled to use physical violence (pushing, slapping, punching, kicking, choking) if his wife goes out without telling him.	Pearson chiz(4) = 23.9176 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 13.5026 Pr=0.009	Reject Ho	
Q86. The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to.	Pearson chiz(4) = 13.1980 Pr= 0.010	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 13.0304 Pr=0.011	Reject Ho	
Q87. A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old.	Pearson chiz(4) = 21.6155 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 12.5779 Pr= 0.014	Reject Ho	
Q88. A father is entitled to receive a bride-price (money goods and animals paid to the bride's family) for his daughter.	Pearson chiz(4) = 25.0322 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 2.3841 Pr=0.666	Not reject Ho	
Q89. Parents are entitled to circumcise their male children.	Pearson chiz(4) = 1.2369 Pr=0.872	Not reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 72.3491 Pr=0.000	Reject Ho	
Q90. Parents are entitled to circumcise their female children.	Pearson chiz(4) = 9.7423 Pr=0.045	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 14.6933 Pr= 0.005	Reject Ho	
Q91. If a daughter has a relationship with an unsuitable man, her father or brother is entitled to use physical force/violence to punish her for bringing dishonour on the family.	Pearson chiz(4) = 64.3974 Pr= 0.000	Reject Ho	Pearson chiz(4) = 9.8544 Pr=0.043	Reject Ho	



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